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INTRODUCTION 
The first installment of this two-part Article series illustrated how the 
federal and state lawmaking processes disadvantage urban areas.1 That 
disadvantage accounts for the inability of a president strongly preferred by 
urban voters, Barack Obama, to accomplish much, if any, of his domestic 
agenda after 2010. It also explains, at least in part, the one-party 
domination of the federal government as of 2017. Despite losing the 
popular vote by almost three million, Donald Trump nonetheless won the 
Electoral College by a margin of 304–227.2 Republicans won the total vote 
for the United States House in 2016 by just a percentage point, yet maintain 
an ironclad seat majority of 241–194.3 Finally, in the Senate, despite holding 
a 52–48 advantage in seats, Republicans represent a minority of the nation’s 
population.4 This new, one-party federal government can be expected to 
                                                                                                             
 1. See Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 1–The Urban 
Disadvantage in National and State Lawmaking, 77 LA. L. REV. 287 (2016) 
[hereinafter Urban Disadvantage]. 
 2. Hillary Clinton was thought to have won seven more electors’ votes, 
making for a 304–234 loss, but these seven defected and cast their votes for other 
candidates, mostly as a protest. See Scott Detrow, Donald Trump Secures 
Electoral College Win, with Few Surprises, NPR (Dec. 19, 2016, 4:52 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/2016/12/19/506188169/donald-trump-poised-to-secure-
electoral-college-win-with-few-surprises [https://perma.cc/ZUG9-CBRY]. 
 3. Ballotpedia has the Republicans winning 49.13% of the popular vote and 
Democrats winning 48.03%. United States House of Representatives Elections, 
2016, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_House_of_Representa 
tives_elections,_2016 [https://perma.cc/JUG3-68U9] (last visited Feb. 13, 2017). 
 4. See E.J. Dionne Jr., The Minority Is in Charge, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (Dec. 8, 2016, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/2016 
/12/08/The-minority-rules/stories/201612080063 [https://perma.cc/KS3L-EWFE] 
(noting that after 2016 elections, Senate Democrats will represent 55.33% of the 
nation’s population). 




pursue policies that skew toward the rural and exurban voters who formed 
such an important part of its victory coalition. 
At the state level, the urban disadvantage has played out vividly in 
states like North Carolina, where the legislature in 2016 preempted 
Charlotte’s municipal transgender protections through the “Bathroom 
Bill.”5 Other states stand on the precipice of enacting similar preemptive 
legislation.6 In other “purple” states like Arizona, Florida, Michigan, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, the state legislatures have aggressively 
preempted local authority in numerous important substantive areas, from 
minimum wage and paid sick leave to gun control.7 As the first part of this 
series argued, these policies likely do not represent the views of the median 
voter in these states, but rather skew toward the preferences of rural and 
exurban voters. 
Hence, at least for those with progressive political leanings, local 
government is often now seen as the most responsive and nimble level of 
government in the United States and indeed worldwide. From public 
health and gay rights to climate change and gun control, cities’ activism 
                                                                                                             
 5. H.B. 2, 2016 Gen. Assemb., 2d Extra Sess. (N.C. 2016) (preempting 
Charlotte, N.C., Ordinance 7056 (Feb. 22, 2016)), http://charmeck.org/city/char 
lotte/nondiscrimination/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/P78V-KDV4]. The 
scope of the state preemption law was sweeping. It prohibits not only additional 
local employment and public accommodation protections of any kind beyond state 
law, but also any local minimum wage ordinances. Id. 
 6. David A. Graham, What’s Behind the New Wave of Transgender 
“Bathroom Bills”?, ATLANTIC (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics 
/archive/2017/01/states-see-a-new-wave-of-transgender-bathroom-bills/512453/ 
[https://perma.cc/G2Y8-HNZK] (discussing efforts to enact similar legislation in 
Texas, Virginia, and Kentucky). 
 7. Purple states—also known as battleground or swing states—are the states 
that the major candidates in the last few presidential elections have most 
vigorously contested. See generally Fred M. Shelley & Ashley M. Hitt, Purple 
States in the 2016 Presidential Election, 13 GEOGRAPHY TEACHER 124 (2016). 
For a detailed account of state preemption of local minimum wage, paid sick 
leave, and antidiscrimination laws, see NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, CITY RIGHTS IN 
AN ERA OF PREEMPTION: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS (2017), http://www.nlc 
.org/sites/default/files/2017-03/NLC-SML%20Preemption%20Report%202017-
pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/8UEX-4GF8]. Recent prominent firearms preemption 
laws include Florida’s 2011 law that imposed liability on local officials who 
enforce gun restrictions beyond those mandated by state law, see 2011 Fla. Laws 
109 (amending FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.33), and Arizona’s similarly aggressive 
statewide preemption of local firearms regulation in 2016. 2016 Ariz. Sess. Laws 
ch. 132 (amending ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3108) (allowing court to impose 
fines up to $50,000 on cities that violate state law and terminate local employees). 




where states and the federal government either obstruct action or fail to act 
can only be expected to increase.8 In taking on these issues, cities are 
addressing subjects or using modes of regulation that are not unique to 
local government. Public health and climate change are hardly “local” 
issues, yet cities are attempting to regulate these areas even if they are 
outside any “traditional” municipal domain of regulation.9 
Taking the “urban disadvantage” as a given, this Article posits that 
local lawmaking in urban areas may serve as a modest corrective and shift 
the cumulative local, state, and national legal framework back toward the 
views of the national median voter. Were local, state, and federal 
lawmaking merely layers of sediment, the ability of local lawmaking to 
serve as a corrective to state and national deficiencies would be limited 
primarily by matters of scale. For instance, if residents of urban areas 
prefer stricter gun control, as most do, they could simply add such 
restrictions to the pre-existing national and state regulatory layers. The 
effectiveness of this extra layer of regulation might be limited by the 
ability of guns to slip through city and state lines, but cities would at least 
be able to impose a more preferable regulatory regime within their own 
boundaries.10 
Cities’ limited geographical jurisdiction, however, is not the only or 
even primary limitation on the effectiveness of their regulatory choices. 
Rather, the frequent preemption of city authority by Congress and 
especially state legislatures prohibits local governments from layering or 
reducing additional regulation when they see fit. This preemption has 
                                                                                                             
 8. See Kenneth A. Stahl, Local Home Rule in the Time of Globalization, 
2016 BYU L. REV. 177, 181–82; Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public 
Health?, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219 (2014) [hereinafter Why Innovate?]; Matthew 
J. Parlow, Progressive Policy-Making on the Local Level: Rethinking Traditional 
Notions of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 371, 375–82 (2008); 
Richard Briffault, Home Rule for the Twenty-First Century, 36 URB. LAW. 253, 
259–60 (2004). 
 9. For skepticism of the notion that cities even have a “traditional” policy 
domain, see Why Innovate?, supra note 8, 1222–23. As an example, consider civil 
rights efforts in 1950s at the local level. See John R. Thompson v. Dist. of Columbia, 
203 F.2d 579, 599–600 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (citing numerous city ordinances prohibiting 
racial discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations); see also 
Pamela H. Rice & Milton Greenberg, Municipal Protection of Human Rights, 1952 
WIS. L. REV. 679 (1952) (revealing that, as of 1952, a handful of cities had 
antidiscrimination ordinances that applied to private employment). 
 10. Court-recognized substantive constitutional restraints, of course, also 
limit city policy choices. E.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) 
(holding that the Second Amendment right to bear arms is an individual right that 
can be enforced against states and cities).  




become particularly frequent, impactful, and noteworthy in states where 
the urban–rural divide is strongest. It may soon become more common at 
the federal level as well. With the threat of state legislative, congressional, 
and presidential override, therefore, local governments are highly 
constrained in how they can implement their residents’ preferred policies. 
If preemptive action represented the median view of the nation’s or 
states’ cumulative voters, including urban residents, such preemption 
would be relatively unproblematic. Local control would be usurped, but it 
is not uncommon or remarkable for the level of government representing 
the larger geographical unit and the higher number of people to have the 
final say. Because the federal and state lawmaking processes are structured 
so as to underrepresent the urban viewpoint, however, there is good reason 
to question the democratic legitimacy of preemption, particularly when 
targeted at large and densely populated urban areas. 
Interestingly, local government law holds out some promise that city 
enactments might be protected from state legislative override. In some 
states, courts interpret the state constitution to carve out a sphere of “local” 
issues in which the actions of the local government are immune to or more 
robustly protected from state legislative override.11 The United States 
Supreme Court famously called this system of home rule “imperium in 
imperio,” or an “empire within an empire,” in the late 19th century.12 In 
states with such a system of home rule, court-enforced immunity to 
preemption from state override is usually rooted in the state constitution. 
A legislative decision to override local authority, therefore, might run 
afoul of this protection; hence, “imperio” home rule is sometimes also 
referred to as “constitutional home rule.”13 
Although only a few states employ a pure “imperio” form of home 
rule today, elements of the approach remain in more states than is 
commonly recognized. At its core, constitutional home rule rests on a 
judicially defined distinction between “statewide” and “local” matters, 
                                                                                                             
 11. See Appendix B (listing such states). 
 12. St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 149 U.S. 465, 468 (1893); see also City 
of New Orleans v. Bd. of Comm’rs of the Orleans Levee Dist., 640 So. 2d 237, 
241–42 (La. 1994) (reviewing the “imperio” model of home rule). 
 13. In this sense, “constitutional home rule” has a more specific meaning than 
merely a home rule provision rooted in a state’s constitution. Many state 
constitutions provide for the power to legislate at the local level, but only a subset 
thereof have been interpreted to provide immunity also to state legislative 
override. It is this smaller subset to which “constitutional home rule” refers as 
used in this Article. See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 




with only the latter being immune to preemption.14 Courts have long struggled 
to articulate this distinction in a neutral, principled fashion, leading many 
states to abandon the system for “legislative” home rule, wherein the 
legislature may preempt all matters.15 Nonetheless, constitutional home rule 
or some version of it stubbornly persists, particularly with respect to local 
decisions regarding the structure of municipal government or municipal 
employment. Many states instead or in addition recognize a softer version of 
constitutional home rule, requiring that state preemption be of a certain form, 
and often substance, to override city enactments legally. In some states, for 
instance, local enactments may be immune to state legislative preemption if 
the potentially preemptive statute is deemed not to address a matter of 
“statewide” or “general” concern.16 In other states, courts purport to inquire 
only as to legislative intent to preempt, but often consider the domain of 
municipal regulation that would be preempted as a factor in their analysis.17 
As currently enforced, constitutional home rule is a somewhat awkward 
and incomplete remedy for the urban disadvantage. Constitutional home rule 
is often seen as a way of protecting a local minority from the will of the 
statewide majority, usually on matters deemed to have little effect on the rest 
of the state’s community, such as the local form of government.18 In the 
current environment, however, much statewide legislation does not actually 
represent the will of the statewide majority. Hence, constitutional home rule 
                                                                                                             
 14. Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and 
Judicial Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1341 (2009) (noting that 
constitutional home rule “center[s] on the divide between local and statewide 
affairs”). 
 15. See, e.g., City of La Grande v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 576 P.2d 1204, 1213–
14 (Or. 1978) (“A search for a predominant state or local interest in the ‘subject 
matter’ of legislation can only substitute for the political process . . . the court’s 
own political judgment whether the state or the local policy should prevail.”). 
Although the La Grande majority did not so admit, the approach to home rule 
pronounced by that opinion was a sharp departure from a prior Oregon Supreme 
Court opinion, State ex rel. Heinig v. Milwaukie, 373 P.2d 680 (Or. 1962), that 
essentially embraced a judicially enforced “local”–“statewide” subject matter 
distinction. See La Grande, 576 P.2d at 1224 (Tongue, J., dissenting) (accusing 
the majority of overruling Heinig). 
 16. See Appendix B (listing these states). 
 17. E.g., Li v. State, 110 P.3d 91, 99 (Or. 2005) (holding that state marriage 
law preempted county same-sex marriage policy because of state’s historic 
interest in regulating this subject). 
 18. E.g., Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 862 A.2d 1234, 1242 (Pa. 2004) 
(“[M]atters affecting merely the personnel and administration” of Philadelphia 
“are of no concern to citizens elsewhere.”). 




now ironically might serve as a device for protecting policies that appeal to 
a statewide majority from override by a legislature that represents a minority. 
The overarching concern of this project is the effect of anti-majoritarian 
lawmaking on local policy choice. Hence, across-the-board constitutional 
home rule for every city or county in a state might compound the urban 
disadvantage should it benefit rural and exurban municipalities whose 
residents’ views are already more than adequately represented in the 
legislative process. Constitutional home rule, therefore, is a potential double-
edged sword. Its ability to ameliorate the urban disadvantage depends on the 
details of that disadvantage in a particular state and which municipalities 
may avail themselves of constitutional home rule. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the impact of the 
urban disadvantage on federal preemption and possible doctrinal remedies 
thereto. Any potential remedies run into two hard-and-fast federal 
constitutional rules: first, that all states are to be treated equally; and 
second, that cities and states are conflated under federal preemption 
analysis. If committed to curing the urban disadvantage, the Supreme 
Court might reconsider these doctrines, but this Article takes these 
doctrines as a given. 
Part II of the Article then explores the doctrines that grant and limit 
local power at the state level, fleshing out constitutional home rule in more 
detail. Part III explores the possibility of using constitutional home rule to 
help cure the urban disadvantage that exists in many state legislatures. Part 
III also highlights the peril of constitutional home rule inadvertently 
strengthening populations in areas whose views are already sufficiently 
represented, if not overrepresented, at the national and state levels. Part IV 
turns the lens of the Article’s analysis to local government itself and asks 
whether its structural design can bear the responsibility that would 
accompany the power to enact legislation that is immune to state 
legislative override. Finally, Part V examines what effect an emboldened 
constitutional home rule, which technically and most directly affects state–
local relations, might have on the federal order. 
I. REMEDYING THE URBAN DISADVANTAGE IN THE FEDERAL ORDER 
Reorienting Home Rule: Part 1 articulated at length the manner in 
which the U.S. Senate, House of Representatives, and state legislatures 
frequently and systematically underrepresent the views of urban voters.19 
This Part summarizes that account before analyzing the implications for 
the urban disadvantage at the federal level. Proceeding from the premise 
                                                                                                             
 19. See Urban Disadvantage, supra note 1. 




of one-person, one-vote, the Senate greatly disadvantages more populous 
(“larger”) states. The state of California, with 39,000,000 people, receives 
two senators, just as the state of Wyoming does with fewer than 600,000 
people. This underrepresentation ratio of 66 to 1 makes the Senate one of 
the most malapportioned legislative bodies—from the standpoint of one-
person, one-vote—in the world.20 Proportionally, more underrepresented 
states are urbanized.21 That the Senate’s composition hurts urban areas in 
pursuing these areas’ policy goals is a straightforward conclusion. 
In contrast to the Senate, the U.S. House roughly complies with one-
person, one-vote.22 Nonetheless, the uneven geographic distribution of 
voter ideology, combined with the prevailing use of winner-take-all, 
reasonably compact, contiguous districts, substantially dilutes the urban 
voice in the chamber. Political scientists have demonstrated that the 
dynamic of packing like-minded voters into small districts frequently 
occurs with respect to “left-leaning,” urban voters in many populous 
states.23 In states such as Florida, the urban-favored political party, the 
Democratic Party, receives far fewer seats in the state legislature than its 
total, statewide vote count would predict because its voters are primarily 
packed into small urban districts.24 In other words, Democratic candidates 
win these districts 90–10, while Republicans win suburban, exurban, and 
rural districts 60–40. Aided by intentional, political gerrymandering 
perpetrated by Republican-dominated state legislatures in many states, this 
dynamic has also greatly influenced the composition of the U.S. House of 
Representatives in recent years. Democratic candidates, for instance, won 
the total vote count by more than 1,400,000 votes in 2012, yet Republicans 
                                                                                                             
 20. See id. at 308 n.86 (noting that only Argentina, Brazil, and Russia violate 
one-person, one-vote more than the U.S. Senate). 
 21. See infra notes 47 and accompanying text.  
 22. The House deviates slightly from one-person, one-vote first because of 
the requirement that every state have at least one representative, and second, 
because of the fact that districts may not cross state lines. Neither of these factors, 
however, systematically militates against the interests of large states. See Urban 
Disadvantage, supra note 1, at 322 (“The rounding errors that result from House 
apportionment do not systematically favor small states.”). 
 23. See Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional Gerrymandering: 
Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239, 264 
(2013); Jonathan A. Rodden, The Long Shadow of the Industrial Revolution: 
Political Geography and the Representation of the Left 138 (Mar. 25, 2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://web.stanford.edu/~jrodden/wp/shadow.pdf. 
 24. Chen & Rodden, supra note 23, at 264 (“[I]n contemporary Florida and 
several other urbanized states, voters are arranged in geographic space in such a 
way that traditional districting principles of contiguity and compactness will 
generate substantial electoral bias in favor of the Republican Party.”). 




maintained a seat count majority of 234 to 201.25 Pointing to the history of 
the Democratic Party in the 20th century, Rodden argues that even when 
the urban-favored political party wins a seat majority, it achieves this 
margin only by relying on “moderate” representatives in swing, suburban 
districts, thus resulting in an ideologically incoherent majority.26 In an 
exhaustive study, Rodden demonstrates that the phenomenon of urban 
underrepresentation is hardly uniquely American; it is common in any 
country that relies on a “first-past-the-post” system of representation using 
compact and contiguous districts, which is a more common practice in 
former British colonies.27 
The urban disadvantage would not be nearly as important if there were 
not strong ideological divisions between urban and rural or exurban voters. 
Such divisions exist on many policy matters, however. Urban residents 
generally favor stronger gun control; proportionally more spending on 
public transit, including rail; higher minimum wages; antidiscrimination 
protection for sexual minorities; stronger environmental protections; 
looser regulation of marijuana; a more forgiving approach to illegal 
immigration; and a more secular form of government.28 In the last 10 to 
20 years, the national party most receptive to these urban political 
priorities has been the Democratic Party.29 Barack Obama won two 
                                                                                                             
 25. Urban Disadvantage, supra note 1, at 323. 
 26. Rodden, supra note 23, at 138, 167. 
 27. See generally id. (examining numerous countries that are former British 
possessions, such as New Zealand, Australia, and Canada). 
 28. See Loey Nunning, 6 Big Differences That Turn City Dwellers into Liberals, 
CRACKED (Feb. 18, 2017), http://www.cracked.com/blog/6-ways-big-cities-turn-you-
liberal-converts-perspective/ [https://perma.cc/43SU-K7NN] (explaining why urban 
voters prefer higher minimum wages, more public transit, and looser enforcement of 
immigration laws); Robert Mikos, Marijuana Localism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
719, 735 (2015) (noting that opposition to marijuana legalization in states that have 
held ballot initiatives has been more concentrated in thinly populated counties). On 
the urban preference for secular values, see Rodden, supra note 23, at 10–11, 96–
99. On big cities’ comparative willingness to protect rights of sexual minorities, see 
Reid Wilson, Study: Big Cities Most Likely to Have Progressive Gay-Rights Laws, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp 
/2013/11/19/study-big-cities-most-likely-to-have-progressive-gay-rights-laws/?utm 
 _term=.141b6a4f5bd1 [https://perma.cc/RS3A-DBYM] (“The nation’s largest cities 
are most likely to have laws that benefit gays and lesbians, while smaller cities and 
those in the South are least likely to accommodate homosexuals . . . .”). 
 29. Drew DeSilver, The Growing Democratic Domination of America’s 
Largest Counties, PEW RESEARCH CTR.: FACT TANK (July 21, 2016), http://www. 
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/21/the-growing-democratic-domination-of- 




elections representing most of these values in large part because of strong 
support from urban voters. Indeed, because all states but two award their 
electoral college votes on a statewide rather than district basis, urban areas 
are at less of a disadvantage in electing the chief executive than they are 
in determining the composition of the Senate or House.30 The inability of 
President Obama to enact his agenda in the face of a hostile Congress, 
despite handily winning re-election in 2012, was due in no small part to 
the urban disadvantage in Congress. 
Donald Trump’s election in 2016 ushers in a new era for the urban–
rural divide at the federal level. As in previous elections, the urban–rural 
split was pronounced. Trump won overwhelmingly in smaller and less 
densely populated counties, while Hillary Clinton overwhelmingly won 
the largest and most densely populated cities.31 For instance, Clinton won 
Manhattan by 579,013 to 64,929, or 87% to 10%; San Francisco by 
345,084 to 37,688, or 84% to 9%; and Philadelphia by 584,025 to 108,748, 
or 82% to 15%. Even in “red” states, the pattern of the Democratic 
candidate winning large cities held; in Texas, for instance, Clinton easily 
won the counties in which Dallas, Houston, Austin, and San Antonio sit.32 
Although it would be convenient for this Article’s thesis to attribute 
Trump’s victory to the Electoral College’s amplification of small-state 
power—Wyoming, for instance, receives one-eighteenth of California’s 
electoral votes despite having one-sixty-sixth of its population—it appears 
that Trump’s victory had a different cause. Trump won the Electoral 
College because he barely won several key swing states—Florida, 
Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin.33 Each of those states, like all the 
other states except Maine and Nebraska, awards its electoral votes on a 
winner-take-all basis.34 Hence, despite nearly tying Trump in those four 
states, Clinton took zero electoral votes while Trump took 75. 
                                                                                                             
nations-largest-counties/ [https://perma.cc/LZ27-XGAM] (noting Democratic 
“dominan[ce] in big cities”). 
 30. Urban Disadvantage, supra note 1, at 30–35. 
 31. See Lazaro Gamio, Urban and Rural America Are Becoming Increasingly 
Polarized, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics 
/politics/2016-election/urban-rural-vote-swing/ [https://perma.cc/4BYK-SYZK]. 
 32. Clinton won Dallas County 61%–35%, Harris County in Houston 54%–42%, 
and Bexar County in San Antonio 54%–41%, all despite losing Texas 52%–43%. 
 33. Nate Cohn, Why Trump Had an Edge in the Electoral College, N.Y. TIMES: 
THE UPSHOT (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/upshot/why-
trump-had-an-edge-in-the-electoral-college.html [https://perma.cc/9BK7-2ZM7]. 
 34. See About the Electors, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., 
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/electors.html#selection 
[https://perma.cc/V8PF-RH9P] (last visited Mar. 12, 2017). 




Regardless, the next two years will highlight extraordinary tension 
between the federal government, which tilts ideologically away from the 
preferences of the median national voter, and those states and cities that 
tilt in the other direction. California, for instance, has indicated that it 
intends to fight the federal government on matters from immigration 
enforcement to climate change.35 Leaders of large cities like Chicago, New 
York, Portland, and San Francisco have pledged to resist the efforts of a 
Trump administration to deport undocumented aliens.36 Several cities have 
already sued the Trump administration regarding its plans to cut off federal 
funding to “sanctuary cities.”37 Already, residents of urban areas are 
turning out in the thousands to protest President Trump’s first moves on 
immigration.38 In other matters, such as climate change, health care, and 
LGBT rights, local governments and large states are also likely to resist 
attempts by the federal government to preempt.  
A. States Suffer Urban Disadvantage Too 
Vis-à-vis the federal government, it is not just residents of large cities 
that bear the brunt of Senate malapportionment. All residents of large 
states, even those in rural areas, suffer to some extent from the federal 
government’s composition. The larger the state, the more all of its 
residents suffer from Senate malapportionment. California, for instance, 
with over 12% of the nation’s population, wields only 2% of the Senate’s 
voting strength and only 10% of the Electoral College, and therefore 
suffers at the hands of states with amplified power like Alaska, Idaho, and 
                                                                                                             
 35. Adam Nagourney, California Hires Eric Holder as Legal Bulwark Against 
Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/04 
/us/california-eric-holder-donald-trump.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/TBD4-S3SU] 
(citing California state senate leader as predicting that California would challenge 
Trump administration on the environment, immigration, and criminal justice). 
 36. Ruairí Arrieta-Kenna, Sanctuary Cities Stand Firm Against Trump, POLITICO 
(Dec. 12, 2016, 5:14 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/12/sanctuary-cities-
trump-immigration-232449 [https://perma.cc/KA7Y-GMDH]. On January 31, 2017, 
San Francisco filed the first lawsuit by a city challenging President Trump’s threat to 
withhold federal funds. See generally Complaint, City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 
3:17-cv-00485 (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2017). 
 37. See generally Complaint, City of Chelsea v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-10214-
GAO (D. Mass. filed Feb. 10, 2017); Complaint, City & County of San Francisco 
v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017). 
 38. Jonathan Martin, As Democrats Take to the Streets, Lawmakers Rush to Keep 
Up, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/politics 
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Montana.39 All factors being equal, therefore, the more populous the state, 
the more disadvantaged it is by the Senate and to a much lesser extent the 
Electoral College. 
All factors are not equal, however, with respect to policy goals. For 
instance, voters in California and Rhode Island, which is vastly 
overrepresented in Senate, likely favor stricter gun control and environmental 
regulation.40 Voters in Texas, which is vastly underrepresented, and Idaho 
generally prefer the opposite.41 If large states have enough like-minded, small-
state allies, then perhaps the Senate’s gross deviation from one-person, one-
vote is of no significance, at least with respect to policy goals rather than non-
ideological “pork” spending.42 
Although large states do have small-state allies, they do not have 
enough to mute their disadvantage in the Senate on many issues. Voter 
ideology correlates more significantly with density of a state’s population 
than with absolute population.43 Although Rhode Island’s population is 
tiny in absolute terms, it is the second-densest population in the nation.44 
California’s is the eleventh-densest population.45 Likewise, although 
Texas is the second most populous state, its population is in the bottom 
                                                                                                             
 39. In addition, Washington, D.C. residents, who number more than 670,000, 
suffer from receiving no representation despite having more residents than either 
Vermont or Wyoming. For more discussion of this and detailed data, see Urban 
Disadvantage, supra note 1, at 308–10. 
 40. In a 2014 ranking of states’ ideology, Gallup ranked California and Rhode 
Island among the most liberal, or at least among the least conservative. See Frank 
Newport, Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana Most Conservative States, GALLUP 
(Feb. 6, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/181505/mississippi-alabama-louisiana-
conservative-states.aspx [https://perma.cc/UKR6-ZQUU]. 
 41. Id. (ranking Idaho as “most conservative” and Texas as “above-average 
conservative”). 
 42. Urban Disadvantage, supra note 1, at 20 & n.88. 
 43. See Richard Florida & Sara Johnson, What Republicans Are Really Up Against: 
Population Density, ATLANTIC: CITYLAB (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.citylab.com/poli 
tics/2012/11/what-republicans-are-really-against-population-density/3953/ 
[https://perma.cc/YL3Y-MTMW] (including a graph of 2012 presidential election 
results plotted against population density); but see Richard Florida, What Makes a Dense 
Urban County Vote Republican?, ATLANTIC: CITYLAB (Feb. 9, 2015), 
http://www.citylab.com/politics/2015/02/what-makes-a-dense-urban-county-vote-re 
publican/385299/ [https://perma.cc/SC4Z-89E4] (discussing outliers to this trend). 
 44. Population numbers are based on the 2014 Census estimate, Population 
Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popest/data/state 
/totals/2014/ [https://perma.cc/T9AF-FU34] (last visited Feb. 13, 2017). 
 45. Id. 




half of population density.46 Because there is a rough correlation between 
a state’s absolute population and population density, large states are 
overall hurt by the Senate’s composition. Despite some outliers, most large 
states are relatively densely populated. Of the top 17 states—all those that 
are disadvantaged by the two-senator rule—11 are also within the top 17 
of population density.47 Likewise, the ten least densely populated states 
are among the 18 least-populous states.48  
As a result of the House’s and Senate’s compositions, it is exceedingly 
difficult for a popular majority drawn mostly from densely populated areas 
to promote its affirmative governance agenda. A majority of voters 
nationally may desire a tighter national gun control regime. If this majority 
draws disproportionate support from voters in the more populous states, 
or those in urban areas, it will have much less success at achieving its 
legislative goals than if its support is spread evenly among and within 
states. Urban-favored proposals, therefore, need an even larger reservoir 
of support to be viable politically than do those favored by residents more 
diffusely distributed.49 
Residents of urbanized states are also often on the losing side of 
national policies pushed forward by legislators from less densely 
populated areas that preempt the regulatory goals of large states. Because 
of the Senate’s malapportionment, it is possible for legislation that enjoys 
support from senators representing only the 30 smallest states—which 
constitute only 24% of the national population—to displace state policies, 
even those of the largest states.50 This concern is not just hypothetical. For 
instance, a state might prefer to maintain tort liability for firearms 
manufacturers, even those that operate primarily within the state. In 2005, 
however, Congress passed a federal law, the Protection of Lawful 
Commerce in Arms Act (“PLCAA”), with strong support from small-state 
legislators that preempts any state regime to the contrary.51 Indeed, the 
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 47. Id. These states include (followed by total and density ranks): California 
(1, 11); Florida (3, 8); New York (4, 7); Illinois (5, 12); Pennsylvania (6, 9); Ohio 
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 48. Id. These states include: Alaska (48, 50); Wyoming (50, 49); Montana 
(44, 48); North Dakota (47, 47); South Dakota (46, 46); New Mexico (36, 45); 
Idaho (39, 44); Nebraska (37, 43); Nevada (35, 42); and Kansas (34, 41). 
 49. For recent examples of this phenomenon, see Urban Disadvantage, supra 
note 1, at 312–15. 
 50. Id. at 314. 
 51. Pub. L. No. 109–92, 119 Stat. 2095 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 
(2012)). 




Senate passed the law by the seemingly overwhelming, filibuster-proof 
majority of 65–31.52 When accounting for the populations of the states 
whose senators voted for the legislation, however, it passed by a much 
more modest 58%–42%.53 That 58% majority would not overcome the 60-
vote filibuster requirement if the Senate were apportioned on the basis of 
population. Moreover, any future Senate with a majority more sympathetic 
to gun control would almost certainly never be able to overcome the 
filibuster or even gain a majority of Senate votes to reverse the law given 
the small-state advantage. 
Likewise, the House of Representatives passed the PLCAA by a 
seemingly overwhelming vote of 283–144, or 65%–33%. Much of the 
bipartisan support for the bill came from “blue-dog” Democrats 
representing more rural and exurban areas.54 Many urban-centered 
representatives, both Democrat and Republican, voted against the 
legislation.55 The overwhelming vote in favor may have represented the 
views of a majority of the American people, but this majority’s legislative 
clout was amplified by the advantages rural and exurban areas reap 
through a system of compact, contiguous, first-past-the-post district 
representation—which was explained in Part 1 of this series. 
Unlike the PLCAA, in which Congress’s intent to preempt was clear 
and express, many other instances of federal preemption are more 
muddled. Preemption often results from a judicial interpretation that 
Congress “intended” to preempt state and local regulatory regimes without 
expressly saying so.56 In other instances, preemption is a consequence of 
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 53. See Appendix A. 
 54. See S. 397 (109th): Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/109-2005/h534 [https://perma 
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representatives from Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode 
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/2005/10/21/politics/congress-passes-new-legal-shield-for-gun-industry.html [https: 
//perma.cc/3JCJ-Y8VF] (noting “considerable Democratic support” for the bill). 
 55. See S. 397 (109th): Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, supra 
note 54, (counting four Republican “no” votes, including from the Connecticut 
suburbs of New York City, suburban Chicago, and relatively urbanized 
Delaware). 
 56. See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1141 
(2007) [hereinafter Intrastate Preemption]. Technically, “field” preemption and 




agency action that flows, however imperfectly, from congressional 
delegation.57 Even if preemption in these instances is less clearly a result 
of intentional congressional action, it still flows from the structure that 
disadvantages highly and densely populated states. In theory, agency 
officials appointed by a majoritarian-elected president—such as President 
Obama, who twice won the popular vote with a majority of the vote—
might take democracy-remediating concerns into account when 
promulgating regulations.58 Even if acting so boldly, however, they would 
do so under the shadow of the Congress that delegates them their power.59 
Any attempt to do so, moreover, would face inevitable challenge before 
federal courts applying both the organic statute and the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”) passed by Congress.60 
B. Assessing Big-State Immunity to Preemption 
One potential solution to preemptive national policies that reflect the 
urban disadvantage in national lawmaking would be for the federal 
judiciary to enforce constitutional immunity tailored on the basis of 
population. The Supreme Court has for years wrestled with whether the 
Ninth and Tenth Amendments, or just the structure of the Constitution’s 
enumerated grants of power to Congress, guarantee states a reserve of 
power with which the federal government may not interfere. Dating back 
to National League of Cities v. Usery,61 progressing to Garcia v. SAMTA,62 
                                                                                                             
“conflict” preemption are separate forms of Congress preempting state law, each 
with slightly different emphases. In practice, however, the line between the two 
is fuzzy. Id. (first citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990), 
and then citing French v. Pan Am. Express, Inc., 869 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989)). 
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 58. Cf. Chevron and Preemption, supra note 57, at 769–71 (discussing 
presidential control over executive branch agencies as a means of ensuring their 
democratic responsiveness). 
 59. Id. at 790 (agency must follow requirements imposed by Congress). 
 60. Id. at 794 (“[A]n agency’s reliance on federalism concerns apparently 
uncontemplated by the statutory scheme thus could present legal problems [under 
the Administrative Procedure Act.]”). 
 61. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
 62. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 




and illustrated vividly again by NFIB v. Sebelius,63 the Court has struggled 
to articulate any principled method for how, or even whether, states may 
be immunized from federal regulatory mandates.64 To remedy the urban 
disadvantage in federal lawmaking, stronger Tenth Amendment protections 
for California than for Montana as a way to compensate for California’s 
disadvantage in the federal order might be desirable. 
David Dana has offered a “weaker” version of this proposal, arguing 
that the popular support a policy enjoys as reflected through the populations 
of the states that have adopted it ought to influence the Supreme Court’s 
adjudication of preemption questions when congressional intent is unclear.65 
Like any judicial test that incorporates political analysis, there would be 
major questions about the courts’ capacity to administer it.66 How many 
small states must “gang up” on large states to trigger the extra scrutiny? 
What would the congressional vote count need to be? How many large states 
need be affected? Could large states object when a regime was imposed on 
top of whatever pre-existing mixture of laws they had before, or only when 
a specific positive enactment was displaced? These are no doubt difficult 
questions, but they are not necessarily more difficult by any order of 
magnitude than the questions associated with modes of analysis the 
Supreme Court has embraced over the years, such as the scrutiny of 
legislation that burdens “discrete and insular minorities”67 or whether 
government action “endorses” religion in the eyes of a “reasonable 
observer.”68 
The more serious doctrinal problem with both Dana’s proposal and the 
stronger version offered herein is the Supreme Court’s strong presumption 
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 64. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 
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David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 
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in favor of treating all states equally. Often referred to as the “equal-
footing doctrine,” the principle holds that once admitted to the union, each 
state must be treated the same way as every other, particularly with respect 
to matters of sovereignty.69 In Coyle v. Smith, for instance, the Supreme 
Court invalidated the section of Oklahoma’s Enabling Act, passed by 
Congress, that limited where the newly admitted state could put its capital 
for a certain period of time.70 The Coyle Court cited the importance of states 
in the union being “equal in power, dignity, and authority, each competent 
to exert that residuum of sovereignty note delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution itself.”71 
The Court has permitted Congress to treat states differently when 
compelling circumstances justify it, but it has expressed discomfort with 
such treatment. Indeed, in Shelby County v. Holder, the Court cited Coyle in 
invalidating the Voting Rights Act’s requirement that certain states undergo 
the arduous preclearance procedure when making voting changes.72 The 
Supreme Court usually applies the equal-footing doctrine when reviewing 
acts of Congress challenged on other substantive constitutional grounds, but 
it presumably binds the Court’s own jurisprudence as well. There may be 
good normative reasons, particularly in an era of a president elected despite 
losing the popular vote by almost 3,000,000 for California, for example, to 
receive special treatment in preemption jurisprudence. Any judicially 
imposed democracy-remediating immunity doctrine, however, would have 
to overcome this significant doctrinal obstacle.73 
Even putting aside the equal-footing doctrine, there may be institutional 
problems with tasking federal judges with remedying the urban 
disadvantage through stronger immunity for large-state enactments. 
Although they enjoy life tenure, members of the judiciary are confirmed by 
the malapportioned Senate. The Senate can be expected, therefore, to screen 
judges for any such sympathies; small-state senators, in particular, would be 
expected to object. Further, judges usually conceptualize their role in 
preemption decisions as one of interpreting dutifully Congress’s “intent.”74 
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Equal Footing in the Admission of States, 3 BAYLOR L. REV. 519 (1951). 
 70. 221 U.S. 559, 563–64 (1911) (citing Oklahoma Enabling Act of 1906, 
Pub. L. No. 59–234, 34 Stat. 267). 
 71. Id. at 567. 
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 73. See Dana, supra note 65, at 512–13. 
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To ask federal judges to engage in a completely different sort of endeavor 
would upend this judicial self-image. 
Finally, in certain large states, such as Texas, at least formally 
disadvantaged by the Electoral College and the Senate’s composition, the 
views of the median voter may be more in agreement with the legislative 
output produced by the federal government. In other “purple” states such as 
Pennsylvania, Florida, and North Carolina, the median voter may hold views 
to the left of the legislative output of both Congress and their own state 
legislatures because of both intentional and unintentional gerrymandering.75 
Hence, providing bolstered immunity from federal override to a large state 
like Florida or North Carolina might actually reinforce the urban 
disadvantage. By contrast, a stronger normative—if not doctrinal—case for 
bolstered immunity applies to two types of states: (1) those where state 
legislative gerrymandering is muted, such as in states that have removed 
political considerations from districting, like Arizona and California;76 and (2) 
those whose cumulative political preferences are relatively evenly distributed 
throughout the state, such as New Jersey and Massachusetts.77  
C. Assessing Big-City Immunity to Preemption 
If large and densely populated states are disadvantaged by the federal 
legislative process, large and densely populated cities are, in many ways, 
even more disadvantaged. New York City, for instance, with a population 
of 8,500,000, has more people than all but 11 states.78 Nonetheless, any 
local ordinance the city enacts can be preempted by a Congress that 
overstates the preferences of voters in sparsely populated states and rural 
areas. To overcome the filibuster in the Senate, a bill supported by senators 
representing the least possible number of people would still account for 
24% of the 50-state population, or approximately 75,000,000 people. The 
idea of 75,000,000 people preempting 8,400,000 may not seem 
problematic at all.  
On closer look, however, the cumulative disadvantage cities suffer in 
the federal order is more problematic for two reasons. First, unlike states, 
they receive no institutional representation within Congress.79 States enjoy 
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“political safeguards” that help prevent Congress from ever attempting to 
preempt a unique state policy in the first place, whereas cities enjoy no 
such advantage.80 Second, large cities are often interested in the same 
types of policies as each other because of their dense, diverse, and 
cosmopolitan populations. Any particular city policy that Congress 
preempts, therefore, may represent a beachhead of emerging urban support 
for a policy. For instance, when Congress passed the PLCAA, it had the 
effect of nullifying city legislation that would hold gun manufacturers 
strictly liable for harm caused by their products. Although only one city—
Washington, D.C.—had passed such an ordinance by the time of the 
PLCAA’s passage, it is possible that more cities would have done so over 
time.81 Further, even absent preemption, like-minded cities have no formal 
mechanism for banding together to pursue policy choices; states, by 
contrast, may form bi- or multi-state compacts with congressional 
approval.82  
When viewed en masse, urban America represents a large, relatively 
disempowered segment of the general population. In the 297 cities that 
have populations of greater than 100,000, 90,000,000 people live; in the 
81 cities with populations over 250,000, 58,000,000 people live; and in the 
11 cities with populations over 1,000,000, 25,600,000 people live.83 The 
number of people in the 11 largest cities is greater than the total living in 
the 17 smallest states.84 Yet the 24,000,000 people in the smallest 17 states 
are represented by 34 senators—enough to block a treaty—while the 
nearly 26,000,000 living in the 11 largest cities are represented by a mere 
12 senators, those from New York, Arizona, Illinois, Pennsylvania, 
California, and Texas, whom, of course, they share with the residents of 
the rest of their states.85  
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Even if by this measure large cities are more disadvantaged than large 
states, current federal constitutional doctrine again provides no comfort to 
cities. Under black-letter Supremacy Clause doctrine, local enactments are 
treated the same as state laws for preemption purposes.86 Arguably, local 
enactments should receive less judicial protection from federal override 
because the Constitution’s “immunity-granting” provisions, like the Tenth 
Amendment, refer only to states, not localities.87 Annie Decker has argued 
that in passing federal legislation, Congress should be more careful about 
whether it preempts both state and local law or only one or the other.88 
Decker offers several good reasons why Congress might choose not to 
preempt local law even when it preempts state law.89 Given that the urban 
disadvantage is part and parcel of Congress’s design, however, Congress 
is likely institutionally incapable of wielding its preemption power in a 
manner that would remedy the disadvantage. Moreover, although there is 
no “equal-footing doctrine” for states, there is no precedent yet for the 
notion that large-city enactments might be more immune to federal 
preemption than those of small cities. Such an approach follows from the 
normative analysis of this project, but it would be groundbreaking and, 
again, the federal judiciary may be ill-suited to administer it.90 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL HOME RULE OR “MINI TENTH AMENDMENTS” 
In contradistinction to their place in the federal order, local 
governments occupy a vaunted place in many state constitutions. “Home 
rule” is a protean concept used to describe many different governmental 
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systems that embrace some form of local control, from Ireland to 
Washington, D.C.91 In state constitutional law, the term refers to a legal 
regime in which cities need not seek state permission before taking action 
on a certain subject. For instance, in most “home-rule” states, a city that 
wants to enact a paid sick-leave ordinance may do so unless and until the 
state legislature says that it may not.92 A home-rule regime stands in 
contrast to a state that uses Dillon’s Rule, whereby cities are presumed 
powerless unless and until granted express authority by the legislature to 
address a particular subject.93 In a Dillon’s Rule state, a city wanting to 
adopt paid sick leave would need to point to a specific statutory 
authorization from the legislature to sustain the ordinance against legal 
attack. 
A clear majority of states have some version of home rule for cities 
and counties.94 In most of these states, cities are empowered to address 
whatever subject they wish, but they may be preempted by the state on 
most matters. In some states, like Alaska, the state constitution imposes a 
system of pure “legislative supremacy,” or “legislative home rule.”95 That 
is, cities enjoy authority to enact whatever they want so long as not 
prohibited by state law or the constitution. Legislative home rule is a 
misnomer in states like Alaska that also have the initiative system for 
statutory matters.96 In these states, “the people”—expressing themselves 
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directly through the initiative—are as capable of preempting local power 
as is the legislature.97 
A. Constitutional, or Imperio, Home Rule as a Provider of Immunity to 
State Override 
In a significant number of home-rule jurisdictions—approximately 
15—the state constitution either explicitly limits the ability of the state 
legislature to override certain local enactments, or the state supreme court 
has so read the constitution.98 The traditional name for a home-rule regime 
that immunizes local action to statewide preemption is “imperio.”99 In a 
classic “imperio” regime, the state judiciary divides the realm of local 
enactments into matters of local, statewide, or mixed concern. When the 
legislature attempts to preempt a “local” matter, the local policy will 
prevail. When mixed or statewide, the state law will prevail. 
Most states’ home-rule doctrine is a mix of imperio and legislative. 
Many states are simply internally inconsistent. In others, the constitutional 
text or case law allows for local immunity for certain kinds of local 
enactments but not for others. The National League of Cities breaks down 
local enactments into four categories: structural, personnel, functional, and 
fiscal.100 Structural home rule means control over one’s form of 
government.101 This control might mean, for example, deciding how many 
city councilors to have, whether those councilors are elected at large or by 
district, how long their terms are, and whether they are part-time or full-
time. Personnel authority gives a local government the ability to set 
employment policies for its employees.102 Functional authority is perhaps 
the most important for this Article’s purposes: it is the ability to regulate 
anyone or anything in the jurisdiction, usually under a police-power 
grant—for that reason this Article will refer to it as “regulatory.”103 
                                                                                                             
 97. See Initiative and Referendum States, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS., 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/chart-of-the-initiative-states 
.aspx [https://perma.cc/5CW3-Q83T] (last visited Feb. 13, 2017) (listing the 14 states 
with direct initiative processes). 
 98. See Appendix B (listing home-rule states with some strain of 
jurisprudence like the one described). 
 99. See supra note 12. 
 100. Local Government Authority, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, http://www.nlc.org 
/build-skills-and-networks/resources/cities-101/city-powers/local-government-author 
ity [https://perma.cc/QSM2-CNEN] (last visited Feb. 1, 2017). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 




Finally, fiscal authority is the authority to raise revenue, either through 
borrowing or taxation, as well as the authority to decide how to spend such 
revenue.104 
Of the 15 states that recognize home-rule immunity for some types of 
enactments, most do so for only one or two of these categories. Structural 
and personnel home rule are the areas in which immunity is most 
prevalent.105 Fiscal and regulatory home rule are the least common, 
although a few states recognize some home rule in the regulatory sphere 
for matters denominated “local.” 
Imperio home rule has the greatest effect when enshrined in the state 
constitution. If local governments’ protections against state override is 
merely statutory, legislatures can overrule it. For this reason, imperio 
home rule is sometimes also referred to as “constitutional home rule.”106 
When constitutionalized, imperio home rule functions like a miniature 
version of the strong Tenth Amendment that states’ rights advocates have 
championed at the federal level.107 Interestingly, even in states where the 
constitutional system of home rule is not self-executing or it expressly 
allows the legislature to weaken local authority, the courts have 
nonetheless recognized some realm of local enactments that cannot be 
overruled by the state legislature.108 Somehow these states have a form of 
imperio home rule that is not guaranteed by the state constitution. It may 
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be that home-rule statutes in these states have acquired the aura of a “super 
statute.”109 
In the handful of states that have some form of imperio home rule for 
local regulatory or fiscal enactments, ordinances governing substantive 
matters of local concern are immune from statewide legislative override. 
In Colorado, this approach is buttressed by the state constitution’s 
language that local charters and ordinances involving “local and municipal 
matters . . . shall supersede . . . any law of the state in conflict therewith.”110 
In these states, the extent of immunity for local regulatory enactments 
depends completely on the distinction between “local” and “statewide.” 
To articulate this distinction, the Colorado Supreme Court has relied on 
several criteria. Most prominent among them are tradition, extraterritorial 
effects, and the need for statewide uniformity.111  
Of the Colorado Supreme Court’s factors, tradition perhaps is the most 
suspect. Even if the “traditional” realm of local government matters could 
be adequately catalogued, there is no good reason why cities should be 
bound to continue to operate in this realm.112 One of the primary benefits 
of home rule is cities’ ability to serve as agents of policy experimentation 
and change.113 Confining their actions to a fixed realm of “traditional” 
prerogatives severely limits cities’ ability to function as agents of policy 
experimentation and change. Similarly, merely because local governments 
have “traditionally” operated in a realm, they ought not necessarily be 
permitted impunity in their continuing regulation. Land use is an obvious 
example. Although it is often considered a “traditional” local concern, the 
record of local governments using their authority therein to exclude 
“undesirable” uses, like low-income housing, is legion.114 
The criteria of extraterritorial impact and the need for statewide 
uniformity of regulation have more to be said for them even if they too are 
difficult to implement. Many of the states that protect only personnel or 
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structural matters from statewide preemption offer similar reasons for that 
approach. In Pennsylvania, for instance, the courts have said that matters 
of “personnel and local administration” are of no concern to residents of 
the rest of the state—i.e., they have no extraterritorial impact of 
significance and there is no need for uniform statewide regulation.115 
Within the regulatory sphere, the Colorado Supreme Court has 
invoked the extraterritorial and uniformity factors in declaring various city 
ordinances, such as local bans on sex offenders and fracking, as regulating 
“statewide” matters and, therefore, susceptible to preemption by the 
state.116 Laurie Reynolds has extensively analyzed the “extraterritorial 
impact” factor.117 She notes that courts applying the factor assess both the 
effect of a lone-city ordinance, as well as the possible cumulative effect of 
other cities adopting similar ordinances.118 Reynolds concludes that courts 
use “extraterritorial impact” as “cover for imposing their own political 
assessment of the local laws at issue” and thus argues that it should be 
abandoned.119 
Reynolds is likely correct that courts strain their institutional capacity 
in attempting to assess the “extraterritorial impact” of local laws. Indeed, 
when cities address controversial and high-profile issues, any 
extraterritorial impact from the city action will necessarily also be difficult 
to assess neutrally. Raising the minimum wage in a city, for instance, 
whether directly or through other employee-friendly regulation, will have 
a negative extraterritorial impact if residents believe that the minimum 
wage promotes unemployment. By contrast, if residents believe that a 
higher minimum wage lifts all boats, there will be no or little negative 
extraterritorial impact. Indeed, there is arguably a positive impact. No 
obvious answer to this debate presents itself. Nobel-Prize-winning 
economists argue both sides.120 Similarly, if a county loosens gun 
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regulations, its voters may argue that they are doing so because allowing 
more guns in the hands of law-abiding citizens leads to less crime. Urban 
areas in the state are likely to disagree and are also likely to claim that they 
will be on the receiving end of the negative externality of loose gun sales. 
Does gun regulation really work? Should courts have to answer this 
question in order to properly allocate state and local power? 
There will, however, be more obvious cases where a city is clearly 
seeking to externalize costs to other cities, such as exclusionary zoning 
and draconian bans on sex-offender residency. In these instances, courts 
employing the imperio approach would likely be correct to label the 
matters “statewide.” Indeed, although the Colorado Supreme Court 
generally considers zoning a “local” matter,121 it exempts zoning laws that 
implicate a “statewide concern.”122 In response to Laurie Reynolds, 
Michelle Anderson suggests that rather than abandon the “extraterritorial 
impact” factor, courts would do well to discipline it by requiring a showing 
of a significant impact outside of the city limits.123 Under Anderson’s 
view, courts can still play a useful role in policing the extent of local 
authority in imperio regimes in the regulatory sphere.124 As both Reynolds 
and Anderson recognize, even when a court categorizes the matter 
regulated by an ordinance as “statewide,” they are not invalidating it per 
se; they are merely permitting the state legislature to preempt when and if 
it sees fit.125 The spillovers from one city’s policy to others may force the 
state legislature to address an issue it might have otherwise avoided.126 
Similar to the “extraterritorial-impact” factor in assessing the extent 
of local immunity is the criterion of the need for statewide uniformity. The 
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Colorado Supreme Court recently invoked this factor in its decision 
invalidating local fracking bans.127 This factor as well looks at whether 
state regulation would be superior to a potential local “patchwork” of 
regulation.128 As applied, application of the factor often revolves around 
courts’ view of the scale of the problem. If a problem or issue transcends 
local boundaries, it is likely to be classified as “statewide.”129 
To the extent that it can be separated from the extraterritorial-impact 
factor, the need for statewide uniformity is arguably in more tension with 
the logic of home rule and its power to promote innovation. One goal of 
home rule is policy experimentation. If a local ordinance creates no 
cognizable harm besides the mere non-uniformity of regulation, that lack 
of uniformity is arguably not the kind of harm against which courts need 
to guard.130 In this sense, the uniformity factor is arguably overinclusive. 
On the other hand, the factor is underinclusive in that almost all issues 
have importance at the state, national, and even international levels. An 
issue as seemingly local as parking can have tremendous effects on more 
obviously global issues like carbon emissions and climate change.131 
The extraterritorial impact and uniformity factors are not arguments 
for local regulation. Rather, these factors only help delimit local immunity. 
In contrast, the democratic-accountability argument is a first-order 
argument for local policymaking. This argument rests less on technical 
competence than on the notion that local governments are more 
democratically legitimate because they are “closer” to the people.132 This 
justification for local self-rule has a distinguished pedigree in American 
legal and political thought. Important 19th-century forebears of this 
argument include Alexis de Tocqueville and Thomas Cooley.133 It is into 
this rich vein that present-day proponents of local autonomy across the 
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political spectrum attempt to tap when making a renewed argument for 
“constitutional” home rule. There are good reasons to be skeptical of the 
democratic-accountability argument for local autonomy.134 Nonetheless, 
this argument can serve as a guidepost for sketching the bounds of a 
constitutional home-rule system and can explain the approach of many 
states in immunizing local structural decisions from state override. 
Aside from the functional, technical, and democratic arguments 
regarding constitutional home rule, courts are also guided by the text of 
the constitution. In a handful of states, such as California, the constitution 
specifically requires immunizing certain local actions to state override.135 
Administering these categories—often structural or personnel—raise the 
same line-drawing issues discussed thus far. Arguably, however, in these 
states the state’s constitutional text provides at least some positivist 
mooring for this line-drawing exercise. 
B. Modified Immunity to State Override 
Some of the states that provide immunity for certain local enactments 
also regulate the state’s ability to override local enactments in a less direct 
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way by requiring that preemptive laws be “general” or “uniform.” Applied 
most literally, these constitutional provisions are formal or procedural, 
requiring that when preemption occurs, it apply equally to all cities, or at 
least all cities of a similar class. Additional states provide no absolute 
immunity for any category of enactment, but still require generality or 
uniformity of some or all preemptive laws. In all, approximately 16 states 
demand generality or uniformity from their state legislatures to preempt 
some local enactments.136 
Although usually formalistic and procedural, generality provisions 
can also have more substantive bite. The Ohio Supreme Court, for 
instance, lays out four factors for deciding whether a state statute is a 
general law. To qualify as a general law for home-rule purposes,  
a statute must: 1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative 
enactment; 2) apply to all parts of the state alike and operate 
uniformly throughout the state; 3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar 
regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative 
power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary or 
similar regulations; and 4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens 
generally.137  
Applying this test, the Ohio courts have invalidated what they see as 
selective or partial legislative withdrawal of local authority.138 
For instance, in the seminal case articulating the standard for general 
laws, City of Canton v. State, the Ohio Supreme Court invalidated a state 
preemption statute that prohibited local governments from prohibiting 
mobile homes in areas zoned for single-family homes.139 The court 
invalidated the law in part because of its potential uneven application 
across the state and because it did more to prohibit local action than 
affirmatively prescribe a “rule of conduct.”140 The invalidation of the law 
insulated cities’ de facto authority over zoning from preemption,141 and at 
the same time may have limited the state’s ability to promote affordable 
housing.142 
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In a later case, the Ohio Court of Appeals relied on City of Canton’s 
general law doctrine to uphold local authority to regulate the public health. 
In 2011, Cleveland passed an ordinance that prohibited restaurants from 
serving foods containing artificial trans fats.143 At the behest of major fast-
food companies, however, the Ohio legislature included within its biennial 
appropriations bill an amendment that prohibited local governments from 
enacting trans-fats restrictions, thereby preempting Cleveland’s ordinance 
before it was even implemented.144 Cleveland sued, arguing that the 
preemption provision violated its protected sphere of local regulation, 
which entitled it to “adopt and enforce within [its] limits such local police, 
sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general 
laws.”145 An Ohio appellate court agreed, holding that the legislation was 
not “part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative” approach to 
regulating food safety and therefore did not meet the state’s judicial test 
for what is a “general” law.146 Similarly, a recent trial court decision in 
Ohio invalidated a state law on generality grounds that sought to preempt 
Cleveland’s “Fannie Lewis Law,” which required that city contractors hire 
a certain percentage of city residents and low-income persons.147 
The supreme courts of New Mexico and Arizona have also relied on 
the “general law” doctrine to invalidate efforts by the legislature to 
regulate cities’ structures. The New Mexico Supreme Court held that a city 
could decide for itself how many commissioners it would have rather than 
be subject to a state law mandating five commissioners.148 In shielding the 
city of Clovis from a seemingly preemptive state law, the court decided 
that the state law was not “general” because it interfered with a matter of 
“local” as opposed to “statewide” concern.149 
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The Arizona Supreme Court’s application of the generality doctrine is 
more remarkable because there is no such textual requirement in the 
constitutional home-rule provision. Nonetheless, the court held that 
Tucson could preserve its unique, partisan system of electing city 
councilors through ward-based primaries and at-large general elections 
despite a state law that clearly sought to end this practice.150 Tucson’s 
system was enshrined in its charter, but the state constitution requires 
charters to be “consistent with, and subject to . . . the laws of the state.”151 
Relying on a 60-year-old case, the court grafted a condition onto the 
preemptive scope of state law, concluding that “laws of the state” in the 
constitution refers only to “laws addressing matters of ‘statewide interest’ 
rather than ‘local concern.’”152 Because Tucson’s mode of electing 
commissioners was of local rather than statewide interest, it was immune 
to preemption by the seemingly overriding state law.153 
Although the Arizona and New Mexico decisions concerned structural 
matters, neither court expressly limited their holdings to that realm, 
thereby holding out the possibility that another local action, perhaps 
regulatory, might qualify as “local” enough to receive immunity from state 
preemption through their analysis. Indeed, the Tucson majority relied 
heavily on a 1951 Arizona case that explicitly embraced a division 
between statewide and local matters, articulating a “laundry list” of which 
matters are “statewide” and which are “local.”154  
In specifically protecting structural matters from state legislative 
override, Arizona, New Mexico, and the other states that take a similar 
approach impliedly or explicitly endorse the democratic-accountability 
argument for home rule. If local governments should be able to control 
anything, the argument goes, it should be the design of their own 
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governments.155 This assertion is questionable upon further inspection. For 
instance, whether a local government uses at-large or district voting—a 
quintessential choice of municipal government design—can affect the 
degree of minority representation on the governing body.156 A weak-
mayor form of government in a major central city may lead to the kind of 
executive impotence that can harm the functioning of an entire region.157 
This possibility does not mean that the external effects are likely to be as 
significant with these kinds of choices as with other, more substantive 
matters, but rather that such effects are at least possible and must be 
recognized. 
Indeed, the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld a state law requiring cities 
to elect their council members from districts rather than on an at-large basis 
even though it conflicted with an Omaha charter provision.158 Exploring the 
statute’s legislative history, the court took note of the sponsors’—including 
the legendary senator Ernie Chambers’s159—goal that district representation 
would ensure more “proportionate” representation of “socioeconomic” 
groups on city councils.160 While reserving the ultimate authority to decide 
what is or is not a “statewide interest” sufficient to override a city charter’s 
structural provision, the court held that the legislature’s decision was worthy 
of deference because it was seeking “to insure the fundamental right to 
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vote and the right to proportionate representation,” a matter that transcends 
“local concern.”161 
The generality and uniformity requirements thus work as a backdoor sort 
of immunity for local governments. They call for a heightened level of judicial 
inquiry into whether the state’s interest in preempting the local government is 
legitimate. In the Cleveland trans-fat case, the fact that the preemption 
withdrew local authority without replacing it with any other regulatory regime 
was a fatal flaw. Perhaps the City of Canton case can be explained by the 
state’s failure to enact a comprehensive regime favoring affordable housing. 
As a selective withdrawal of a city’s zoning authority, the Ohio Supreme 
Court was suspicious. The Nebraska case, however, stands as a cautionary 
note to allowing this backdoor immunity to be absolute. There, the court was 
convinced that the state had legitimate, substantive interests in interfering with 
how local governments structured their councils. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL HOME RULE AS A REMEDY FOR THE URBAN 
DISADVANTAGE IN STATE LAWMAKING 
The extent of the urban disadvantage in any particular state depends 
on a number of factors, including, most notably, a split in political views 
between urban and rural or exurban residents.162 This split is more 
pronounced in some states than others.163 Intentional, political 
gerrymandering and unusually shaped districts designed to comply with 
the Voting Rights Act can also compound the dynamic.164 As Chen and 
Rodden demonstrate, however, political gerrymandering alone cannot 
explain the legislature’s underrepresentation of urban preferences in many 
states.165 Rather, even under the most politically neutral districting scheme 
that complies with the usual state constitutional requirements of district 
compactness and contiguousness, the uneven geographic spread of voter 
preferences will result in a legislature that overstates the values of rural 
and exurban voters.166 
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Just as at the federal level, the urban disadvantage in state lawmaking 
unfolds in a number of realms. Prominent examples of policies often 
favored by urban-centered coalitions, but rejected or even preempted by 
state legislatures include transgender and sexual orientation discrimination 
protections, gun control, higher minimum wages, inclusionary zoning, 
paid sick leave, paid family leave, Medicaid expansion under the 
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), and additional public health measures such 
as menu labeling, trans-fat bans, and clean indoor-air laws.167 If cities were 
simply disadvantaged at the state level, but left free to pursue their own 
policies, the urban disadvantage would be problematic on normative 
grounds, but less so. At least some cities would adopt their preferred 
policies on their own, and the primary limitation on their effectiveness 
would be due to scale and enforcement limitations. As noted earlier, states 
often preempt cities’ choices in these realms entirely. Moreover, certain 
choices, such as expanding Medicaid under the ACA, are for the state 
alone to make. 
Political scientists for years have highlighted cities’ disadvantages at 
achieving their priorities in the state legislature, with earlier explanations 
focusing on the pre-Reynolds malapportionment common in many 
states.168 Some thorough studies of cities’ relative disadvantage focus on 
cities’ abilities—or inabilities—to wrest “special” bills on their behalf 
from the legislature.169 Some of these special bills would provide authority 
over a particular matter to cities that otherwise lack it.170 In this sense, this 
scholarship precedes, or at least analyzes data that precedes, the more 
widespread availability of local authority to initiate legislation as 
implemented by increased home rule across the states.171 In a notable 
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study, Gerald Gamm and Thad Kousser analyze almost 2,000 bills from 
the 1880s to the present and conclude that internal fissures within large 
cities’ state legislative delegations weaken such cities’ clout within the 
body, as do “demographic differences between city residents and those in 
the rest of the state.”172 Unlike the analysis that flows from Rodden and 
Chen’s work, Gamm and Kousser and similar studies ignore cities’ lack of 
success in achieving major statewide policies that disproportionately 
benefit, or are preferred by, their residents, such as those discussed 
above.173 Nonetheless, this other line of scholarship is instructive insofar 
as cities sometimes seek special authority to pursue a policy that might 
prove useful statewide or nationwide, such as New York City’s failed 
pursuit of congestion pricing.174 
If the composition of legislatures disadvantages urban areas because 
of the distortions that result from unevenly constituted single-member 
districts, governors, elected statewide, might be able to temper this 
disadvantage. In theory, governors should hew closer to the median voter’s 
preferences than does the median legislator, and in many states anecdotal 
evidence supports this notion. Nonetheless, the base of governors’ 
electoral coalition and the need for governors to press other items on their 
agenda in the legislature will make it advantageous for governors to sign 
off on, or at least not veto, some or much of the legislation enacted by the 
legislature that is disfavored in urban quarters. Hence, while governors 
elected on a statewide basis should temper the urban disadvantage in the 
state legislature, they are unlikely to ameliorate it completely.175 
If the urban disadvantage is likely to produce legislation hostile to the 
preferences of urban voters, constitutional home rule, or even some lighter 
version of immunity for local enactments, offers a potential ameliorative. 
At the statewide level, this argument is fairly straightforward, particularly 
in those states with pronounced urban–rural splits. For instance, in Ohio, 
urban residents may well be more receptive to the kind of government 
regulation epitomized by Cleveland’s trans-fat ban. Hence, at time-0 the 
city adopts such a policy. Although other major cities, like Cincinnati or 
Columbus, may not adopt a similar policy for a variety of reasons at time-
0, their residents may be open to the idea and would not generally support 
legislation that takes this policy choice off the table. Nonetheless, the rural- 
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and exurban-dominated legislature votes to preempt any city in the state 
from enacting this policy.176 If that legislative choice is viewed as fully 
democratically legitimate, such statewide preemption is unproblematic. If, 
on the other hand, the legislature is viewed as democratically compromised 
because of the urban disadvantage, then a constitutional limit on its ability 
to preempt may have normative appeal. 
The argument is bolstered when considering the role of cities as 
laboratories of policy innovation. Columbus and Cincinnati may well adopt 
a provision like a trans-fat ban at a later time, but their governments may be 
hesitant initially and wait to see how the policy goes over in Cleveland. If 
the policy goes well in Cleveland, Columbus may follow suit, followed by 
Cincinnati, then Akron, Dayton, and other cities. If the state can preempt the 
issue before any city even attempts to address it, however, this policy 
percolation can never occur.177 
A. Objections to an Invigorated Imperio Home Rule 
In subverting the hierarchy of states controlling local governments as 
their “convenient agencies,”178 constitutional home rule strikes some 
observers as “radical.”179 The idea that the policy of one city might be 
completely immune to legislative override is understandably unsettling, 
particularly if the policy is widely unpopular beyond the particular city 
that adopts it. This possibility is probably of most concern in the fiscal or 
regulatory spheres because local personnel or structural enactments may 
be less likely to raise concerns outside the enacting city.180 Taken to an 
extreme of very strong immunity for most local enactments, imperio home 
rule might even violate the United States Constitution, which requires 
states to exercise sovereignty over all their territory.181 Especially where a 
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city blatantly attempts to externalize problems on to other cities, such as 
by banning sex offenders or waste facilities, good reason exists to be 
skeptical of local immunity. The state should have the ability to allocate 
statewide problems fairly throughout the state. 
In many instances, however, local action merely represents a different 
policy choice than that favored by the state legislative regime in power. 
For instance, cities that seek to raise the minimum wage beyond the federal 
and statewide floor are usually not attempting to externalize low-wage 
labor on to surrounding cities. Rather, these cities merely have embraced 
the notion that a higher minimum wage is better social policy, likely does 
not increase unemployment, and actually helps the economy by putting 
more dollars in low-wage earners’ pockets.182 The larger the city and the 
more geographically isolated, the more credible this position is. Big-city 
residents cannot scurry off to the suburbs for every takeout meal, 
pharmacy purchase, and other kinds of transactions in which low-wage 
employees are most typically involved. Although wage ordinances might 
have the effect of keeping some big-box stores out of the city, city officials 
may reject the big-box model of retail provision and prefer an economic 
system in which this model is less viable.183 Similarly, with respect to other 
urban priorities—inclusionary zoning, paid sick leave, transgender rights, 
gun control, and even immigration regulation—the costs and benefits of 
these policies are not easy to determine, even after put into effect. Other 
policies, such as congestion pricing, might be seen as attempts to 
externalize costs onto outsiders, but even these policies may serve 
statewide or national goals and may impose costs on city residents as 
well.184 
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One concern about the imperio approach to regulatory home rule is 
that it creates uncertainty regarding which local actions are immune to 
override and which are not.185 As with any decisional system that defies 
easy and objective prediction, the possibility exists that court decisions in 
this area will be seen as “result based” and political.186 A pure legislative 
system of home rule, by contrast, allows for state preemption of any and all 
matters.187 In those states where immunity is provided only to structural or 
personnel matters, ambiguity still remains regarding whether a particular local 
ordinance or policy falls within such parameters.188 
A related objection to imperio home rule is that some states have 
historically used it to limit the initiative authority of local governments to the 
“local” realm.189 Using this approach, although “local” enactments were 
immune from override, cities were prohibited from addressing “statewide” 
matters even in the absence of preemption. Today, most states that retain some 
version of imperio home rule allow localities to regulate all matters unless 
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and until the state acts to preempt. In Colorado, the court purports to limit 
local government authority over “statewide” matters to those for which a 
state constitutional provision or statute specifically provides authority, but 
in practice classifies most regulatory matters as “mixed” statewide and 
local concerns, in which cities are empowered to act.190 Although the use 
of “local” as a limitation rather than merely a shield remains in some 
states, no reason exists as to why imperio home rule needs to be applied 
this way. Rather, to the extent that this Article endorses constitutional 
home rule, it does so from the premise that any such system leaves all 
policy options on the table at least until the legislature or people speak on 
the matter in some way. 
1. An Imperfect Fit with Respect to Issues 
As currently structured, constitutional home rule is not a good fit for 
remedying the urban disadvantage. Most states that provide some 
immunity for local enactments do so only for personnel or structural 
matters.191 It is in the regulatory and fiscal spheres, however, that 
immunizing big-city local enactments would offer the most potential to 
remedy the urban disadvantage. Imperio home rule in the fiscal realm is an 
awkward fit because most local governments are highly constrained with 
respect to their initiative authority to raise revenue, which means the 
immunity question never arises.192 
In those few states that apply the local–statewide distinction to regulatory 
matters, many of the more important local policies may well fall on the 
statewide side of the divide and therefore remain vulnerable to preemption by 
the state legislature. For instance, if North Carolina had constitutional home 
rule for “local” regulatory matters, which it does not, Charlotte’s ordinance 
providing protection in employment and public accommodations on the 
basis of sexual orientation, gender identity, and other categories might 
have been considered regulation of a statewide or mixed local–statewide 
matter regardless. Therefore, the state legislature would still have been 
free to preempt the ordinance, at least as applied to private actors. 
Nonetheless, more states provide some type of immunity to local 
structural or personnel decisions. Many of the prominent regulatory 
measures cities have adopted also apply internally, thus making them 
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structural or personnel ordinances as well. The preempted Charlotte 
ordinance, for instance, regulates the city’s operations, such as requiring 
contractors not to discriminate on the basis of gender identity, sexual 
orientation, and so forth.193 Many cities have used this more limited scope 
of regulation in part to evade other potential doctrinal proscriptions on 
local power, such as the “private law exception.”194 Hence, cities took the 
first steps toward recognizing the sanctity of gay unions by applying same-
sex benefits to their own employees and requiring that city contractors do 
the same.195 Constitutional home rule for structural and personnel 
decisions, therefore, may not apply as sweepingly, but can still have an 
effect. 
Moreover, certain “structural” matters are substantive in their own 
way. There is a good chance that local campaign finance regulation, for 
instance, would be considered structural and immune—or more 
immune—to preemption in several states.196 This issue is of much concern 
to advocates throughout the country, and it is one that cities may be better 
positioned to address where the constitution has been read to provide some 
protection against state override.197 
Another structural or personnel issue in which immunity to state 
override might be justified to remediate the urban disadvantage in the state 
legislature is that of municipal-employee-residency requirements. In the 
last decade, at least two states—Ohio and Wisconsin—have rescinded the 
authority of cities to require employees to live within city boundaries.198 
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These laws were passed despite stiff opposition by cities. Although some 
deride the ordinances as protectionist, in the wake of police tensions in 
Ferguson, Missouri, and elsewhere, these ordinances could serve as 
models for making a police force more representative of the community.199 
Nonetheless, the suburban- and rural-dominated legislatures in these states 
preempted the local policies, and the cities lost their court cases asserting 
immunity, although not without strong dissents.200 
There are likely substantive regulatory fields in which constitutional 
home rule may be undesirable, even as applied to densely populated cities 
that suffer from underrepresentation in the legislature. For instance, many 
cities, including large and densely populated cities, engage in zoning that 
might be called exclusionary.201 If a state supreme court considers zoning 
to be a “local issue” that the state legislature may not breach, such an 
approach could immunize exclusionary zoning to statewide control. 
Although few state legislatures have affirmatively attempted to tackle 
exclusionary zoning, a constitutional home-rule system that prohibits such 
an attempt would be problematic from the perspective of promoting 
affordable housing. In Oregon, for instance, immunity for local zoning 
would prevent the state’s legendary statewide land-use system from 
requiring localities to offer a mix of housing for different income and 
demographic groups.202 On the other hand, when a city seeks to take on 
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more than its fair share of a regional problem like affordable housing, such 
as by adopting an inclusionary zoning ordinance, constitutional home rule 
would seem more appropriate to prevent or limit state preemption.203 
2. Threshold for Immunity 
Assuming, however, that constitutional home rule is at least a 
somewhat useful method of democratic remediation, the question of which 
cities and counties should benefit arises. Under the normative framework 
of one-person, one-vote, and partisan fairness, the most disadvantaged 
cities in most states are the most populous and the most densely populated. 
This situation is not the case in every state, but it is in the many states in 
which the densely populated, urban areas have political preferences starkly 
different from exurban and rural areas in the rest of the state.204 In states 
like New Jersey, Maryland, or Massachusetts, where the entire population 
is fairly urbanized, there is a weaker claim to any increased urban power, 
just as the claim is weaker in states where rural and exurban voters share 
similar political views, at least on many issues, with those living in densely 
populated cities, such as Colorado, Vermont, and, to a lesser extent, 
Oregon.205 
The Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) likely increases the number of states 
in which a stark urban disadvantage exists.206 In certain Southern states 
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with large numbers of black voters in rural areas, like South Carolina, 
Mississippi, and Alabama, the VRA packs African-American voters into 
majority–minority districts. Without the VRA, these voters—who usually 
share the political preferences, at least on many issues, held by urban 
voters—might be spread out enough so as to counter the urban 
disadvantage common in the more urbanized northern states.207 
It is not just residents of large cities who are disadvantaged in many 
states, but others who reside in large metropolitan areas, even in smaller 
suburbs or unincorporated pockets. Smaller cities with intense left-leaning 
preferences—for example, Ann Arbor and Boulder—feel the effect of the 
urban disadvantage in many state systems insofar as the legislature leans 
away from their voters’ preferences as well.208 Other small cities, by 
contrast, may hew closer to the median legislator’s preference than do the 
college towns—for example, Grand Rapids and Colorado Springs. To be 
seen as legitimate, any system of constitutional home rule would 
undoubtedly need a neutral threshold rather than one based on political 
demographics—for example, party registration—even if the latter might 
more accurately combat the problem identified herein. 
Many states already use population thresholds for home rule 
protections, so the notion of a population “cutoff” has a firm pedigree. 
Illinois, for instance, requires that cities have a population of at least 
25,000 to qualify as a “home-rule unit.”209 Although these thresholds are 
generally lower than what might be adopted for the specific purpose of 
remedying an urban disadvantage in the state legislature, they provide a 
solid precedent for distinguishing among cities by population in terms of 
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their powers.210 States might amend their constitutions to raise the 
threshold for immunity power. Only those cities with populations greater 
than 100,000 or 200,000, for instance, might qualify. 
Even if states retain relatively low population thresholds for home rule 
to apply, many states also require that population-eligible cities 
affirmatively opt in to home rule.211 Not all eligible cities do so because 
opting in to home rule often comes with rights and responsibility. For 
instance, in some states, opting into home rule offers a city or county 
greater structural, fiscal, or regulatory authority but also requires that the 
city reorganize itself in a way different from the default statutory 
regime.212 Opting into home rule can also permit a city greater fiscal 
authority, such as the ability to raise taxes beyond a default level set by the 
state.213 It is likely that only those cities whose populations prefer a more 
activist government would avail themselves of this opportunity, thus 
“tailoring” home rule in a way that may help remedy the urban 
disadvantage in some states.214 
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Even if population thresholds for home rule are lower than ideal for 
remedying an urban disadvantage and are offered by default when a city 
reaches the threshold, it is likely that the cities that most actively use their 
home-rule authority will be the larger ones. These cities are more likely to 
have the full-time, professional city councils and sophisticated administrative 
agencies that play a crucial role in proposing and implementing major policy 
reform.215 Large cities are also more immune to capital or population flight 
because of the adoption of a particular regulation.216 Hence, constitutional 
home rule might protect Charlotte and its adoption of a gay and transgender 
rights ordinance from override even if it also protects Wilmington, Winston-
Salem, and Kannapolis, none of which have adopted such an ordinance. 
Moving beyond cities, providing constitutional home rule to counties 
may be crucial to remedying the urban disadvantage in those states where 
counties, rather than or in addition to cities, play an active role in 
policymaking. With a sufficiently high threshold, county home rule would 
include those densely populated areas near major cities that are similarly 
underrepresented in the state legislature but may not be incorporated into 
their own municipality. In some large metropolitan areas, the merged city–
county government offers an especially helpful structure for local 
empowerment.217  
In theory, a state’s home-rule system might instead draw distinctions 
between those cities or counties that receive constitutional protection for 
their enactments and those that do not on the basis of population density. 
Density likely would be a better metric for remediating the urban 
disadvantage than the cruder total population figure. There is arguably 
some precedent for this approach in that density is often a factor in the 
legal test for whether an area may incorporate under state law.218 Such 
thresholds are fairly low, however. In some states, an incorporated city—
no matter how small—automatically ascends to all the rights of every other 
city in the state.219 In other states, incorporation creates a municipality of 
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some form, but becoming a “home-rule” city requires another step or a 
minimum population.220 No state currently uses density as the next step for 
home-rule eligibility, but there is precedent for the concept. 
Without an appropriate threshold, constitutional home rule might 
compound the urban disadvantage in some ways. In recent years, slow-
moving renaissance has been in favor of local immunity to statewide 
enactment. This movement has attracted interest across the political 
spectrum, usually in smaller communities. The issues that have spurred 
interest in this notion have been environmental protection and food 
regulation, as well as gun control. For instance, in Oregon, some small 
counties have sought to enshrine immunity for local enactments into the 
state constitution to ensure that the state does not site a liquefied-natural-
gas terminal in their backyard, to protect the prerogative of a county to ban 
genetically modified organisms, and to prevent stricter statewide 
background checks for firearms purchases from taking effect.221 In Maine, 
proponents of raw milk in rural areas have sought to nullify state laws that 
require pasteurization.222 
In making their case for local immunity, these proponents often 
ground their arguments in the Tocqueville and Cooley strains of American 
legal thought.223 These proponents care not about the size of the local 
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government unit. Rather, they stress the notion that the American legal 
system should or does provide a “natural” or “fundamental” right to local 
government.224 Attorney and activist Thomas Linzey, for instance, has 
urged communities both small and large to use their “sovereign” local 
government powers to resist environmental impositions from the state, like 
mandates to permit hydraulic fracturing or liquefied natural gas facilities.225 
On gun “rights,” several smaller, rural jurisdictions have enacted ordinances 
or charter amendments that seek to nullify state and federal restrictions on 
firearms transfer.226 In doing so, some have expressly cited Cooley’s famous 
opinion in People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, declaring that local government 
is a “matter of absolute right” that “the state cannot . . . take away.”227 These 
recent efforts to “reclaim” local sovereignty are not entirely new, of course. 
In the 1990s, for instance, several Western rural counties sought 
unsuccessfully to resist federal regulation of public lands by invoking this 
rhetoric, although much of their argument focused on local governments or 
states combating the federal government rather than the state.228 
Despite its distinguished intellectual and historical pedigree, the right to 
local government as a fundamental or natural right has always been a 
minority position in American jurisprudence. Should this “right” bestow 
immunity on all local enactments regardless of city size, as some activists 
argue, the beneficiaries of this immunity would often be the rural and 
exurban communities whose views already receive more than adequate 
representation in state legislatures. This result is especially true where the 
immunized local action would impose potential externalities on surrounding 
communities. For instance, when a community seeks to exempt itself from 
milk-pasteurization laws, it threatens the health of the wider populace who 
might purchase such milk and also threatens to impose the burden of 
medical costs on society at large. Similarly, when a rural county seeks to 
exempt itself from state gun control requirements, it allows firearms to be 
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purchased there that can then be used to commit violence in other parts of 
the state and nation. 
The concern regarding externalities applies to big-city enactments as 
well. Some might think that a higher minimum wage in one of the state’s 
largest cities will hurt the economy of the state overall. Much political 
debate at all levels of government is about which policies work and which 
tradeoffs are acceptable. The premise of this Article is that urban areas are 
at an unfair disadvantage in making their cases at the federal and state 
legislative levels. Hence, local government can counter this disadvantage 
for large cities and can more effectively do so when enactments have a 
stronger immunity to preemption. Local enactments by smaller jurisdictions 
need no such immunity for this purpose. Neither government likely deserves 
immunity for clear, demonstrable externalities.229 
There may be other normative reasons for privileging any local 
enactment over those of the state government. Well-funded interest groups 
may exercise disproportionately more power at the state and federal levels 
than at local levels.230 Democratic accountability of local governments may 
be stronger because of their proximity and lower official–constituent 
ratios.231 These groups are likely part of the reason that many 
communities—large and small—feel disillusioned with higher levels of 
government. Opponents of genetically modified organisms, for instance, 
have achieved some notable success in low-population areas.232 Such 
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success reflects not just the ideological leanings of these areas, but also the 
greater comparative ability of grassroots organizations to succeed at the 
local level in achieving legislation they prefer. These reasons may be good 
to prefer any local action over state or federal action, but they are not 
concerns related to one-person, one-vote and partisan and ideological 
alignment, which are the driving concerns of this series. 
B. Potential Limitations on Constitutional Home Rule 
To assuage concerns regarding where and how to set the threshold for 
immunity to preemption, several factors come into play. First, if a state 
has direct democracy to enact statutes, such a system complies fully with 
one-person, one-vote. In addition, the lack of any district-based voting 
means that urban areas are not disadvantaged in any way. Hence, a system 
of home rule whereby constitutional limits on the state legislature’s power 
to preempt do not necessarily apply to the plebiscite might be preferred, 
because the plebiscite does not create or reinforce the kind of urban 
disadvantage with which this project is concerned.233 For similar reasons, 
a system whereby state preemptive legislation can take effect only when 
ratified by a majority statewide might be preferred. There are, of course, 
legions of problems with direct democracy, as judges and commentators 
have noted, but imposing a specific disadvantage on urban views is not 
one of them.234 
Second, the constitutional home rule remedy need not be wholly 
undertaken to embrace some of its urban remediation benefits. If an 
absolute shield against statewide preemption is too extreme or may sweep 
into its protection more jurisdictions than preferred, a softer version of 
immunity like that used by the Ohio Court of Appeals in Cleveland v. State 
might be preferable.235 Using such an approach, the courts demand a 
general statewide interest that the state legislature seeks to enforce by 
preempting the local ordinance. There is not a hard-and-fast bar to 
preemption, but the state is at least forced to demonstrate that its choice to 
preempt reflects more than simply the influence of a well-connected 
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interest group.236 The state is forced to articulate how the preemptive 
choice furthers a general interest of the public, and it would be required to 
apply that preemption to all local governments of similar form and stature 
equally. In this sense, preemption analysis overlaps with the state courts’ 
enforcement of state constitutional bans on special legislation.237 
C. Other Wrinkles: Chronology and Judicial Enforcement 
Another wrinkle in the notion of using constitutional home rule or 
similar provisions to remedy the urban disadvantage in state lawmaking is 
chronological. First, insofar as the urban disadvantage is a function of state 
legislative district drawing, these districts will vary over time, and the 
disadvantage can be compounded, reduced, or—in some states—even 
eliminated by partisan gerrymandering.238 Because states redistrict every 
ten years, however, it is possible that an urban disadvantage at time-0 may 
no longer be in effect at time-1; legislation from time-0 that constrains 
local power, however, may remain on the books. Moreover, several states 
have delegated district drawing to nonpartisan commissions that purport 
to have eliminated such gerrymandering; nonetheless, legislation may 
remain from before these commissions came into being.239 The power of 
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inertia in the legislative process is strong.240 Although the more urban-
friendly legislature at time-1 might never enact the preemptive legislation 
that was enacted at time-0, it may be much more difficult for it to gather 
the votes to reverse the earlier legislation. 
A possible example of this dynamic recently occurred in Oregon. In 
1999, the Oregon Legislature banned inclusionary zoning. The 
Republican-led state legislature was arguably tilted against urban interests 
in a way that recent legislatures no longer are.241 Nonetheless, the 1999 
Oregon Legislature enacted a ban on inclusionary zoning that persisted for 
many years despite numerous local governments’ strenuous objections to 
it.242 Finally, in 2016, the legislature modestly reversed the ban, but not 
without giving many concessions to landlords and developers along the 
way.243 Prior laws are problematic, particularly when strongly supported 
by powerful interest groups like the homebuilders’ lobby, and much vote-
wrangling took place for the legislature to eke out a reversal of the ban in 
2016. An urban disadvantage may disappear or significantly reduce 
because of systematic changes in state government or changes in political 
demography, but the effects of the prior disadvantage may persist. 
Therefore, one might want constitutional home rule to protect retroactively 
against laws passed when the disadvantage applied in full force. 
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Even if the state constitution can be fairly read to require some sort of 
local immunity, the question remains as to what makes state judges any 
better than state legislatures at enforcing urban preferences. In other 
words, when judges are viewed as political rather than purely legal actors, 
whether they are any better positioned to protect urban populations than 
the state legislature is questionable. In most states, the answer would 
appear to be that judges are better positioned because of the fact that judges 
are elected statewide.244 As a result, insofar as their views reflect the 
voters’ views at all, the median state high court judge should be much 
closer to the median voter than is the median legislator in most state 
legislatures. Judicial elections are notoriously low-information affairs, 
however. It is impossible to gauge whether decisions on home-rule matters 
influence judicial election results at all. Nonetheless, nothing in the design 
of most states’ judicial elections could be expected to institutionally tilt 
judges’ views away from the preferences of urban dwellers. 
IV. CAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT BEAR THE BURDEN 
OF THE PRIVILEGE OF IMMUNITY? 
In considering the idea of elevating certain local enactments beyond 
state legislative preemption, examining the functioning of local 
democracy itself to ask whether it merits this privilege is only reasonable. 
Numerous critiques have been levied at the quality of local democracy, 
including that it is often subject to corruption, voter apathy and ignorance, 
and that it is particularly susceptible to capture by certain interest 
groups.245 An additional critique—that local governments enact few 
policies of statewide or national importance—can be dispensed with 
easily.246 If local governments were not enacting important policies of 
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concern to higher-level authorities, clashes between states and cities 
should be rare. Because city and state policy preferences are frequently in 
conflict, however, it appears that many cities, particularly the largest ones, 
are enacting policies beyond the provision of “bread-and-butter” services 
like parks and trash pickup. 
Even in big cities where councils and mayors may have ambitious 
agendas, however, voter awareness of and turnout for local elections often 
lag behind that for higher-level offices.247 Certainly, as compared to 
federal elections, local-only elections, especially for city council, draw a 
weak turnout.248 As compared to state legislative elections, however, local 
elections are not necessarily far behind. Evidence shows voters consider 
both local and state legislative elections to be “second-order.”249 That is, 
voters know little about the candidates and usually make their decision 
based largely on external cues like national political party affiliation of the 
candidate.250 This phenomenon has two effects unique to the local level. 
First, in the many cities that use nonpartisan elections, voters have even 
less information available on which to base their votes; hence, turnout for 
such elections is often even lower than for partisan local elections.251 
Second, in partisan local elections, the overwhelming urban preference for 
the Democratic Party results in noncompetitive council elections.252 
Winning the Democratic nomination is often akin to winning the council 
seat. Some observers link the overwhelming dominance of the Democratic 
Party with the widely perceived corruption in big cities,253 although there 
is scant empirical support for the proposition that large cities are more 
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corrupt than small ones.254 Even if corruption exists regarding the award 
of government contracts or other forms of largesse, it is hard to see how 
such corruption necessarily impugns policy measures like higher 
minimum wages and ordinances that seek to promote the public health. 
This author’s earlier research has demonstrated that voters may, in 
fact, be less aware of the local candidates for whom they are voting, but 
that this lack of awareness does not necessarily result in less legitimate 
local policy outputs, depending on how legitimacy is defined.255 Rather, 
the lower level of participation is offset by the lower costs of both 
campaigning at the local level and of lobbying local officials. These lower 
costs make local governments more accessible as policy laboratories to 
interest groups that are less well-funded and therefore are often weaker at 
the higher levels of government where legislative races and lobbying are 
more expensive.256 Such interest groups often include more “public-
minded” groups like the Center for Science in the Public Interest, which 
may have a better chance at pushing its agenda through at lower levels of 
government, where money has less influence. Thus, it is not clear that 
lower-profile city elections result in less legitimate or desirable policy 
outputs. 
Putting aside the question of voter participation and awareness, one 
can assess city and county elections by the same metric by which this 
Article has assessed state and federal elections.257 As an initial matter, all 
city and county elections will abide by one-person, one-vote, thereby 
eliminating the major problem that affects national lawmaking. With 
respect to partisan and ideological fairness, local elections are also on 
better footing. In addition to electing their chief executives at large,258 like 
almost all governors, but unlike the President, many city councils use at-
                                                                                                             
 254. Assessing the period of 1880–1930, Rebecca Menes found that 
corruption correlated with city size, but Menes looked at only the 15 largest cities. 
See Rebecca Menes, Graft and Growth in American Cities, 1880 to 1930, in 
CORRUPTION AND REFORM: LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY 
(Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia Goldin eds. 2007). 
 255. Why Innovate?, supra note 8, at 1260–62. 
 256. Id. 
 257. See supra Part I. 
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council itself. See Elected Officials, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, http://www.nlc.org 
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large elections to select individual council members.259 Assuming, 
therefore, that there is some geographical difference in voter ideology or 
partisan preference within a city akin to that existing at the state level—
that is, more liberal voters packed into the more densely populated 
neighborhoods of a city—this difference will not affect the partisan or 
ideological composition of the body if elected at large. 
In those cities with district elections and with geographic sorting of 
voters, a miniature version of the dynamic that affects state and U.S. House 
races might be expected. Liberal voters packed into Manhattan, for instance, 
might “waste” their votes on candidates who win overwhelmingly while more 
conservative candidates win by smaller margins in the outer reaches of 
Queens and Staten Island. The same dynamic could be applied to some other 
big cities, like Chicago with its Bungalow Belt or outer San Francisco. In the 
largest cities, these dynamics likely have only a minimal effect on city policy, 
at least with respect to most of the issues that would attract interest from higher 
levels of government. Although it is true that two of the three councilmen 
from Staten Island in New York City are Republican, there is only one 
additional Republican, who is from Queens, thus giving the Democrats a 
47–3 lock on the body.260 This statistic does not mean that all the 
Democrats are in agreement and that these disagreements do not 
sometimes break down along geographic lines.261 But to the extent that 
voters on the fringe experience an advantage, it will usually only be to 
block or dilute proposals set forth by representatives of the more densely 
packed parts of the city. Thus, any policy output from a city council may 
already tilt away from the preferences of the mean city voter, which means 
that there is even more reason to protect it from usurpation by higher levels 
of government that are systematically biased against cities writ large. 
                                                                                                             
 259. Portland, Oregon, for instance, elects all city councilors (or 
“commissioners”) at large. PORTLAND, OR., CITY CHARTER § 2-201 (2017). Some 
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(2017) (electing ten members of city council by district and seven at large). 
 260. See Council Members & Districts, N.Y. CITY COUNCIL, http://council.nyc 
.gov/html/members/members.shtml [https://perma.cc/C5G6-K9PM] (last visited 
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 261. On Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s congestion pricing proposal, for instance, 
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Moreover, many prominent issues at the local level defy easy partisan 
categorization. Soda taxes, congestion fees, water fluoridation, and horse 
carriage rides—these are some of the issues that have riven city councils 
and voters of late, even in places where voters and city councils are 
overwhelmingly of the same political party.262 Finally, the same caveat 
offered above regarding direct democracy must be offered here.263 Any 
citywide initiative would not suffer from any of the problems inherent to 
first-past-the-post legislative systems. Concerns might still arise when city 
voters, for example, opt against water fluoridation despite a city council’s 
unanimous support following expert advice, but adherence to one-person, 
one-vote and distortion of the median legislator’s views based on 
geography are not among the concerns.264 
V. IMPLICATIONS AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL 
If big cities and counties are worthy of some protection from statewide 
preemption, what implications might this protection have for remedying 
the urban disadvantage at the federal level? As noted in Part I, no doctrinal 
path is currently available for protecting local enactments from preemption 
by Congress. Hence, local enactments will continue to suffer from a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis preemption by the federal government. Efforts by 
big cities, for instance, to hold gun manufacturers liable for the harms 
inflicted by their products will continue to conflict with the gun lobby’s 
exaggerated influence on Capitol Hill, which is due in large part to the 
Senate’s malapportionment and the House’s distorted composition. 
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 263. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
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Nonetheless, constitutional home rule could still help remedy that 
disadvantage indirectly. 
Constitutional home rule allows policies to take root at the local level 
that might otherwise never be adopted or might be preempted quickly after 
adoption. If such policies are adopted and persist because of the protection 
offered by constitutional home rule, they will offer an example for other 
cities, states, and even the federal government to follow. For instance, the 
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) in 2015 announced a ban on 
added trans fats beginning in 2018.265 When New York City was the first 
American jurisdiction to ban them ten years ago, opponents of such 
regulation and the press ridiculed the move.266 Nonetheless, the New York 
state legislature never sought to expressly preempt the city’s ban on trans 
fats, and no litigant came forward to urge a court to read aggressively pre-
existing state statutes to preempt the rule impliedly. Allowing New York 
City’s ban on trans fats to take effect changed the national conversation. It 
provided momentum for other cities, counties, and states to adopt similar 
bans and led to a change in national policy.267 Constitutional home rule, 
therefore, can help remedy the urban disadvantage by allowing policies to 
advance that might otherwise be halted by state authority. 
Local action remains susceptible to being preempted by the federal 
government. Once local action is successful and widespread, however, 
pressure will exist for any such preemption to retain at least some version 
of the increased regulatory scheme that cities had earlier adopted. 
Although cities may have adopted a policy that is a “10” on the scale of 
regulatory stringency at a time when the federal government rated a “0,” 
eventual federal legislation may set a national standard that rates a “5.” 
Although “5” is not as good as “10” from urban residents’ perspective, it 
is better than “0,” and the nation may never have gone from “0” to “5” 
without the local action proceeding and not being preempted. 
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 266. John Tierney, One Cook Too Many, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2006), http://www 
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Even if local action does not spur change or preemption at the federal 
level, a value in allowing like-minded cities around the nation to adopt 
similar policies is still present. Benjamin Barber has written of the need for 
a “parliament of mayors” who can share ideas on policy and even agree to 
bind each other to certain goals.268 Fordham University has recently sought 
to implement this idea.269 At the national level, cities pursuing their own 
policies safe from state preemption—and not pushing so far as to provoke 
federal preemption—create nodes of policy experimentation that offer relief 
to the disadvantaged urban population. Within limits, those preferring the 
urban set of policies, like higher minimum wage, stricter gun control, and 
more protection for public health, can seek out such policies by moving to 
the cities that offer them. Although the option of “voting with one’s feet” is 
a pale substitute for a more robust vote by ballot, constitutional home rule 
might help make the former a better option while other reforms, like 
restrictions on political gerrymandering, seek to bolster the latter. 
CONCLUSION 
Imagine a world in which North Carolina’s controversial “bathroom 
bill” might not preempt Charlotte’s civil rights ordinance, at least with 
respect to Charlotte properties and city employees. As this Article has 
demonstrated, such a world already exists in several states. More than a 
century after its initial emergence, variations of constitutional home rule 
persist among the states despite inconsistent application and little in the 
way of compelling normative justification. This Article has attempted to 
identify such a justification: remedying the urban disadvantage in the state 
and national legislative processes.  
In other words, if constitutional home rule persists, there should be a 
good reason for it. This statement does not mean that constitutional home 
rule is the best method for remediating the urban disadvantage at the state 
and national levels—it is a second-order solution at best. At the federal level, 
far-fetched reforms like evening out Senate apportionment would be far 
more effective. Legislative districting reform in the states, which can affect 
both U.S. House and state legislative elections, is another, slightly more 
realistic remedy than Senate reform. But even neutral redistricting might not 
entirely eliminate the urban disadvantage in first-past-the-post elections so 
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long as compact, contiguous districts are used.270 Given the value of district-
based representation and keeping those districts compact and contiguous, 
constitutional home rule can be a tool that allows the benefits of such 
districting while mitigating some of its drawbacks. Selecting the right dose 
of each medicine is up to each individual state. 
For those who are sold on the concept, the question arises as to how 
more constitutional home rule will arise given that legislatures in states with 
a pronounced urban disadvantage are unlikely to propose such a system. The 
two most likely possibilities are the initiative process in the 18 states that 
offer it for state constitutional change271 and judicial interpretation. The 
initiative process, even with its drawbacks, bypasses any urban disadvantage 
that results from single-member districting. If a proposed system of 
constitutional home rule distinguishes among cities or counties on the basis 
of population, that system may not be an easy sell in rural areas, but the urban 
vote might overpower any such objections. Because the swing voters might 
be those in mid-size cities or suburbs, a proposal’s population cutoff would 
need to be finely tailored to succeed politically and might also depend on the 
extent to which regional governments are empowered in the state. With 
respect to the judiciary, many state constitutional provisions are capacious 
enough to allow for a version of immunity for some local enactments. 
Litigants defending city action could articulate the democracy-remediating 
benefits of such an interpretation. Particularly in states with egregious political 
gerrymandering, courts might lend a sympathetic ear. Just as the Warren 
Court saw its role in the one-person, one-vote cases as remediating a structural 
flaw in the United States democracy, so might some bold state supreme courts 
take up the mantle with respect to constitutional home rule. 
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APPENDIX A. PROTECTION OF LAWFUL COMMERCE IN ARMS 
ACT SENATE VOTE (JULY 2005) 
State 2000 population272 Vote273 
Alabama  4,447,100  Y Y 
Alaska  626,932  Y Y 
Arizona  5,130,632  Y Y 
Arkansas  2,673,400  Y Y 
Colorado  4,301,261  Y Y 
Florida  15,982,378  Y Y 
Georgia  8,186,453  Y Y 
Idaho  1,293,953  Y Y 
Kansas274  2,688,418  Y - 
Kentucky  4,041,769  Y Y 
Louisiana  4,468,976  Y Y 
Maine  1,274,923  Y Y 
Mississippi  2,844,658  Y Y 
Missouri  5,595,211  Y Y 
Montana  902,195  Y Y 
Nebraska  1,711,263  Y Y 
Nevada  1,998,257  Y Y 
New Hampshire275  1,235,786  Y - 
North Carolina  8,049,313  Y Y 
North Dakota  642,200  Y Y 
Oklahoma  3,450,654  Y Y 
Pennsylvania  12,281,054  Y Y 
South Carolina  4,012,012  Y Y 
South Dakota  754,844  Y Y 
Tennessee  5,689,283  Y Y 
Texas  20,851,820  Y Y 
Utah  2,233,169  Y Y 
Virginia  7,078,515  Y Y 
West Virginia  1,808,344  Y Y 
Wyoming  493,782  Y Y 
Total population fully in favor  134,786,453    
Indiana  6,080,485  Y N 
Iowa  2,926,324  Y N 
Minnesota  4,919,479  Y N 
New Mexico  1,819,046  Y N 
Ohio  11,353,140  Y N 
Vermont  608,827  Y N 
Wisconsin  5,363,675  Y N 
Total population half in favor  33,070,976    
                                                                                                             
 272. The 2000 population data was obtained from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
CENSUS 2000 (2001) (Table 1, “States Ranked by Population: 2000”). 
 273. U.S. Senate Roll Call Vote No. 219 (July 29, 2005), 109th Cong., 1st Sess., 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?con 
gress=109&session=1&vote=00219 [https://perma.cc/R2N4-6B6H]. 
 274. Kansas’s population is halved because one of its senators did not vote. Id. 
 275. New Hampshire’s population is halved because one of its senators did not 
vote. Id. 




California276  33,871,648  N - 
Connecticut  3,405,565  N N 
Delaware  783,600  N N 
Hawaii  1,211,537  N N 
Illinois  12,419,293  N N 
Maryland  5,296,486  N N 
Massachusetts  6,349,097  N N 
Michigan  9,938,444  N N 
New Jersey  8,414,350  N N 
New York  18,976,457  N N 
Oregon277  3,421,399  N - 
Rhode Island  1,048,319  N N 
Washington  5,894,121  N N 
Total population fully against  92,383,793    
Total population  260,241,222    
    
Total in favor  151,321,941  58%  
Total against  108,919,281  42%  
APPENDIX B. STATES WITH SOME JUDICIALLY PROTECTED HOME RULE 
This Appendix provides additional explanations and citations for those 
states not discussed in the Article. 
 
Arizona 
Arizona recognizes home-rule immunity for structural decisions; 
additionally, there is a general law requirement read into the constitution.278 
 
California  
California recognizes home-rule immunity for personnel and structural 
decisions in addition to providing a general law requirement.279 The state 
constitution provides, 
It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that the city 
governed thereunder may make and enforce all ordinances and 
regulations in respect to municipal affairs, subject only to 
restrictions and limitations provided in their several charters and in 
respect to other matters they shall be subject to general laws. City 
charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede any 
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Id. 
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 279. See supra note 135 for discussion of personnel. 




existing charter, and with respect to municipal affairs shall 
supersede all laws inconsistent therewith.280  
Colorado  
Colorado recognizes home-rule immunity for structural, personnel, 
regulatory, and possibly fiscal decisions.281 
 
Connecticut  
Connecticut recognizes home-rule immunity for structural decisions 
and partially fiscal decisions. Despite a non-self-executing constitutional 
home rule provision—“The general assembly shall by general law 
delegate such legislative authority as from time to time it deems 
appropriate to towns, cities, and boroughs . . . .”282—the Connecticut 
Supreme Court has held that state laws do not preempt municipal 
ordinances or charter provisions that are of “local concern.”283 In the fiscal 
realm, the court has held that although “a municipality has no inherent 
powers of taxation except those expressly granted by the legislature,” a 
town charter provision governing the allocation of surplus revenue trumps 
a state law to the contrary.284  
 
Hawaii 
Hawaii recognizes home-rule immunity for structural and possibly 
regulatory decisions in addition to providing a general law requirement. 
The state constitution provides some protection for local enactments: 
Section 2. Each political subdivision shall have the power to frame 
and adopt a charter for its own self-government within such limits 
and under such procedures as may be provided by general law. 
Such procedures, however, shall not require the approval of a 
charter by a legislative body. 
Charter provisions with respect to a political subdivision's 
executive, legislative and administrative structure and 
organization shall be superior to statutory provisions, subject to 
the authority of the legislature to enact general laws allocating and 
                                                                                                             
 280. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5 (emphasis added). 
 281. See supra notes 110–11. 
 282. CONN. CONST. art. X (emphasis added). 
 283. Bd. of Educ. of Naugatuck v. Town & Borough of Naugatuck, 843 A.2d 
603, 613 (Conn. 2004) (“[I]n an area of local concern, such as local budgetary 
policy, general [state] statutory provisions must yield to municipal charter 
provisions governing the same subject matter.”). 
 284. Caulfield v. Noble, 420 A.2d 1160, 1164 (Conn. 1979). 




reallocating powers and functions. 
A law may qualify as a general law even though it is inapplicable to 
one or more counties by reason of the provisions of this section. . . . 
Section 6. This article shall not limit the power of the legislature 
to enact laws of statewide concern.285 
Interpreting this provision, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that county 
charter provisions governing the number and qualifications of water 
supply board members, as well as a provision allocating authority for 
deciding liquor control violations, trumped state law to the contrary.286 In 
doing so, the court noted that “the regulation of the manufacture, 
importation and sale of intoxicating liquor within a county is a local 
concern.”287 In dicta, the court also noted that “police function,” or control 
of the police force, is a local matter.288 
 
Idaho  
Idaho provides a general law requirement. The state constitution 
states, “Any county or incorporated city or town may make and enforce, 
within its limits, all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are 
not in conflict with its charter or with the general laws.”289 
 
Kansas  
Kansas recognizes home-rule immunity for regulatory decisions and 
also provides a general law requirement. The state constitution provides, 
Cities are hereby empowered to determine their local affairs and 
government including the levying of taxes, excises, fees, charges 
and other exactions except when and as the levying of any tax, 
excise, fee, charge or other exaction is limited or prohibited by 
enactment of the legislature applicable uniformly to all cities of 
the same class . . . .290  
Interpreting this provision, the Kansas Supreme Court held that because 
the state’s Liquor Control Act did not uniformly apply to all cities, a city 
                                                                                                             
 285. HAWAII CONST. art. VIII. 
 286. Haw. Gov’t Emps. Ass’n v. AFSCME, Local 152, 576 P.2d 1029, 1040 
(Haw. 1978). 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. IDAHO CONST. art. XII, § 2 (emphasis added). 
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Louisiana recognizes home-rule immunity for structural decisions and 
possibly personnel and fiscal decisions. The state constitution allows cities 
that had home-rule charters before the constitution’s adoption in 1974 to 
“retain the powers, functions, and duties in effect when this constitution is 
adopted.”292 This provision would seem to guarantee to such 
municipalities any pre-existing immunity from state override. At the same 
time, however, the constitution also states that “[n]otwithstanding any 
provision in this Article, the police power of the state shall never be 
abridged.”293  
In upholding the state’s preemption of New Orleans’s charter 
amendment establishing a higher minimum wage, the state supreme court 
determined that the preemption was justified because it was a “reasonable 
exercise of the state’s police power” and “necessary to protect the vital 
interest of the state as a whole.”294 The court analyzed thoroughly the 
state’s interest in a statewide minimum wage, deferring somewhat to the 
legislature’s determinations but reserving the ultimate judgment on the 
issue.295 The court’s analysis leaves open the possibility that some other 
state law—particularly one outside of the regulatory realm, where the 
police power is most apt—might not be read as “necessary to protect the 
vital interest of the state as a whole.” In such a case, the local ordinance 
would survive if it would have been immune to preemption before 1974.296  
Indeed, in a prior structural case, the Louisiana Supreme Court held 
that a state law could not override New Orleans’s method for selecting 
members of its aviation board because the statute was not “necessary to 
prevent abridgement of a reasonable and valid exercise of the state’s police 
power.”297 The court there held that the law was prohibited “because it 
changes a home rule government’s distribution of its powers and 
                                                                                                             
 291. State ex rel. Klein v. Unified Bd. of Comm’rs, Unified Gov’t of 
Wyandotte Cty./Kansas City, 85 P.3d 1237 (Kan. 2004). 
 292. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 4. 
 293. Id. § 9(B). 
 294. New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 825 
So. 2d 1098, 1107–08 (La. 2002). 
 295. Id. at 1106–07. 
 296. See id. at 1120 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (arguing that New Orleans higher 
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 297. Francis v. Morial, 455 So. 2d 1168, 1174 (La. 1984). 




functions” in violation of the constitution’s home rule article.298 Francis v. 




Maine recognizes home-rule immunity for possibly personnel or 
structural decisions and also provides a general law requirement. The state 
constitution authorizes “[t]he inhabitants of any municipality [to] alter and 
amend their charters on all matters, not prohibited by Constitution or 
general law, which are local and municipal in character.”299 Moreover, in 
dicta in a case involving local personnel, the Maine Supreme Court 
recognized the possibility “that municipal ordinances or charter provisions 
addressing exclusively local affairs may . . . supersede statutes of state-
wide application.”300  
 
Massachusetts  
Massachusetts provides a general law requirement unless the 
legislature follows enhanced procedure for special law. The state 
constitution provides, 
The general court shall have the power to act in relation to cities 
and towns, but only by general laws which apply alike to all cities 
or to all towns, or to all cities and towns, or to a class of not fewer 
than two, and by special laws enacted (1) on petition filed or 
approved by the voters of a city or town, or the mayor and city 
council, or other legislative body, of a city, or the town meeting 
of a town, with respect to a law relating to that city or town; (2) 
by a two-thirds vote of each branch of the general court following 
a recommendation by the governor; (3) to erect and constitute 
metropolitan or regional entities, embracing any two or more 
cities or towns or cities and towns, or established with other than 
existing city or town boundaries, for any general or special public 
purpose or purposes, and to grant to these entities such powers, 
privileges and immunities as the general court shall deem 
necessary or expedient for the regulation and government thereof; 
or (4) solely for the incorporation or dissolution of cities or towns 
as corporate entities, alteration of city or town boundaries, and 
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 299. ME. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (emphasis added). 
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154, 162 (Me. 1976) (citing Strode v. Sullivan, 236 P.2d 48 (1951) (a case 
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merger or consolidation of cities and towns, or any of these 
matters.301 
Minnesota  
A Minnesota Supreme Court dissent suggests there is home-rule 
immunity for personnel decisions. In deciding a lawsuit challenging a 
1993 Minneapolis resolution extending health benefits to same-sex 
partners, one judge on the Minnesota Supreme Court dissented from the 
court’s holding that the resolution was overridden by state law.302 Judge 
Schumacher would have upheld the resolution despite the seemingly 
inconsistent state law in part because “the grant of medical benefits to city 
employees is solely of local concern and pertaining to management of 
municipal government.”303  
 
Missouri  
Missouri recognizes home-rule immunity for structural decisions and 
possibly regulatory decisions, such as eminent domain. Unlike most states, 
the Missouri courts still occasionally strike down an exercise of local initiative 
power as beyond the realm of local authority, even in the absence of any 
preemptive state law. In Missouri Bankers Ass’n, Inc. v. St. Louis County, for 
instance, the Missouri Supreme Court held that the county’s “Mortgage 
Foreclosure Intervention Code” was beyond the authority granted to the 
county by the state constitution because it “address[ed] a national crisis.”304 
As such, the ordinance addressed a “statewide issue” and therefore was not 
the kind of “purely local concern” the county was authorized to regulate.305  
At the same time, however, a Missouri court of appeals has upheld a 
county charter provision regulating the members of a condemnation 
commission against inconsistent state law.306 At least in the realm of eminent 
domain, locally adopted procedures trump those found in state law.307  
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Nebraska recognizes home-rule immunity for limited structural 
decisions.308  
 
New Mexico  
New Mexico recognizes home-rule immunity for structural and 
personnel decisions in addition to providing a general law requirement.309  
 
New York  
New York provides a general law requirement with exceptions for 
special law. The state constitution provides, 
[T]he legislature . . . [s]hall have the power to act in relation to the 
property, affairs or government of any local government only by 
general law, or by special law only (a) on request of two-thirds of 
the total membership of its legislative body or on request of its chief 
executive officer concurred in by a majority of such membership, 
or (b) except in the case of the city of New York, on certificate of 
necessity from the governor reciting facts which in the judgment of 
the governor constitute an emergency requiring enactment of such 
law and, in such latter case, with the concurrence of two-thirds of 
the members elected to each house of the legislature.310 
While the New York Constitution does not immunize any areas of local 
law absolutely to state override, it ensures that any such override is either 
by general law or by the permitted circumstances for special law. Much 
case law in New York, therefore, revolves around whether a particular 
state enactment regulates a local matter and thus needs to be enacted 
pursuant to the procedures for passing a special law.311  
 
North Dakota  
North Dakota recognizes home-rule immunity for structural and 
personnel decisions. The state constitution provides a foundation for home 
                                                                                                             
 308. See supra notes 158–61. 
 309. See supra notes 148–49. 
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rule,312 but the details are statutory.313 The home-rule statute provides that 
the charter and ordinances made pursuant to the charter supersede “any 
law of the state in conflict,” at least when such municipal enactments deal 
with local or city matters.314 In applying this statutory scheme, the North 
Dakota Supreme Court upheld a city’s decision to merge police and city 
employee pension funds despite arguably conflicting state law.315 
Similarly, the state attorney general opined that the home-rule city of 
Grand Forks could change the composition of its library board in a manner 
that conflicted with state law because the composition of such boards is a 
matter of local rather than statewide concern.316  
  
Ohio  
Ohio recognizes home-rule immunity for structural decisions in 
addition to providing a robust general law requirement.317 
 
Oregon  




Pennsylvania recognizes home-rule immunity for structural and 
personnel decisions.319 
 
Rhode Island  
Rhode Island recognizes home-rule immunity for structural decisions 
and also provides a general law requirement. The state constitution states, 
The general assembly shall have the power to act in relation to the 
property, affairs and government of any city or town by general 
laws which shall apply alike to all cities and towns, but which shall 
not affect the form of government of any city or town. The general 
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assembly shall also have the power to act in relation to the 
property, affairs and government of a particular city or town 
provided that such legislative action shall become effective only 
upon approval by a majority of the qualified electors of the said city 
or town voting at a general or special election, except that in the 
case of acts involving the imposition of a tax or the expenditure of 
money by a town the same shall provide for the submission thereof 
to those electors in said town qualified to vote upon a proposition 
to impose a tax or for the expenditure of money.320 
The constitution specifically reserves “the form of government” to local 
discretion and immunizes it from preemption. Other “local” matters may 
be preempted, but only by “general” legislation.321 The court has also 
stated in dicta that municipalities may not legislate at all on matters of 
statewide concern.322  
 
South Carolina  
South Carolina provides a general law requirement. The state 
constitution states, 
The General Assembly shall provide by general law for the structure, 
organization, powers, duties, functions, and the responsibilities of 
counties, including the power to tax different areas at different rates 
of taxation related to the nature and level of governmental services 
provided. Alternate forms of government, not to exceed five, shall be 
established. No laws for a specific county shall be enacted and no 
county shall be exempted from the general laws or laws applicable to 
the selected alternative form of government.323 
Additionally, “The structure and organization, powers, duties, functions, 
and responsibilities of the municipalities shall be established by general 
law; provided, that not more than five alternative forms of government 
shall be authorized.”324 These provisions prohibit special legislation that 
aim to restructure municipal or county government boards.325  
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South Dakota  
South Dakota provides a general law requirement. The state 
constitution states, “A chartered [local] governmental unit may exercise 
any legislative power or perform any function not denied by its charter, 
the Constitution or the general laws of the state.”326  
 
Tennessee  
Tennessee provides a general law requirement. The state constitution 
states, “[T]he General Assembly shall act with respect to . . . home rule 
municipalit[ies] only by laws which are general in terms and effect.”327  
 
Texas  
Texas provides a general law requirement. The state constitution 
states, “[N]o [home-rule] charter or any ordinance passed under said 
charter shall contain any provision inconsistent with the Constitution of 
the State, or of the general laws enacted by the Legislature of this State.”328  
 
Wisconsin  
Some Wisconsin Supreme Court dissenting opinions suggest vestiges 
of immunity in addition to a general law requirement.329 
 
Wyoming  
Wyoming provides a uniformity requirement. The state constitution 
states, “All cities and towns are hereby empowered to determine their local 
affairs and government as established by ordinance passed by the 
governing body . . . further subject only to statutes uniformly applicable to 
all cities and towns . . . .”330   
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